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Introduction 
ECLAC's activities in connection with the review of the situation of youth in 
Latin America and the Caribbean have been carried out in the context of General 
Assembly resolutions, on the question and of the recommendations of member countries 
of the region,1/ Although , the study of this-issue '.be'gari-3n-.:.the 'geg^ qn^  twenty 
years ago, it has recently taken on a new-impetus, with'diff^PMt.Laspects being 
emphasized in the light of the changes that/have taken place in Latin America and 
the Caribbean and of the problems that have been caused by the crisis. 
In 1983, ECLAC prepared a study 2/ on this question' which represented the' v 
first effort to look at the situation of youth in the context of the changing 
developments of the past few decades and of the problems being faced at present.^/ 
This study was submitted to the first Latin American Regional Preparatory Meeting 
for the International Youth Year (San Jost, Costa Rica, 3-7 October 1983). 'The 
Meeting endorsed the study and drew up guidelines for ECLAC's work in this area. 
These guidelines' are set forth in the Regional Plan of Action for Latin America 
and the Caribbean for the International Youth Year, adopted at the.San Josg Meeting. 
In accordance with these guidelines, ECLAC prepared a follow-up study to be 
submitted to the Second Regional Meeting on youth. ; • • 
This study reaffirms the considerations set forth in the study prepared for 
1983, and, bearing in mind new developments, moves forward to an in-depth study 
of the situations of the different countries. It discusses new concepts a;nd 
theories on the situation of youth in Latin America and what it means, and adds 
an analysis of other questions pertaining to the situation of youth in the region, : 
such,as changes in social and economic structures, social institutions as a 
possible channel for the insertion of youth, consumerism in Latin America and its 
impact on young people, the ¿¿aningftilriess of having a job, the importance of the: ' 
symbolic dimensions of youth as a stage in life, and the identity, of yotith 
vis-a-vis social stratification in the region. • ; • ; • n? 
/I. SOCIAL 
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I. SOCIAL CHANGE AND ITS EFFECT,QN YOUTH 
The youth of Latin America andthe. Caribbean: their relationship 
. with the" processes of transformation of the social . 
structure, change and the crisis 
To voiderstand fully the issue of youth in Latin America and the Caribbean, we must 
consider it within the context of the significant changes that have taken place 
in the social structure and, in particular, in the structure of classes and social 
strata. 
The changes that took place over the last few decades in most Lat'in American 
countries were not confined to changes: within certain groups and with respect to 
their positions within the system. Rather, the society itself began to move 
towards a future, rather indefinite mode * 
Over a period of thirty years, many changes took place which affected the 
population. Its spatial position was modified by, urbanization; from agricultural 
occupations or the production of goods with limited technology, it moved on to 
industrial occupations using advanced technology and occupations in the services 
sectors, providing'-support to production or in social" and community services. From 
cultural levels of illiteracy, the masses gained access to middle and higher levels 
of education which up to the middle of the century had been reserved for the 
elites. Personalized and dependent communications were replaced by mass 
communications disseminated either.by radio and television or by systems established 
in large human conglomerates of educational institutions or economic organizations. 
Finally, patterns of consumption changed parallel to the internationalization of 
societies, the magnitude of which is not under discussion, independently of how 
they may be evaluated. 
In a process of change of this nature, the modern sector already existing in 
society was too small to assimilate the large numbers of recent arrivals and 
transmit to them patterns of socialization and assimilation (a clear example being 
that of the establishment of cities). At the same time, the socialization capacity 
of families was affected by the large gap between their experience and their actual 
situation and between the scanty education of the persons who were becoming 
socialized and the high level of schooling received by those who presumably had 
already been socialized. This created a generation gap which, in some cases, wa© 
perceived as being more serious than the gaps between social groups. 
In these societies which were going through the process of change, the 
mechanisms available for integration into the nascent modern society were very 
contradictory. Some dimensions, such as education and culture, were much more 
accessible than others; some popular sectors even began to feel that education 
enabled them to participate in and influence power. At the sane time, those who , 
tried to enter the political community found it a frustrating experience. In som«e 
cases, participation in politics simply did not happen; in others, it was only 
symbolic or effective participation was followed by violent exclusion. Finally, 
/as regards 
as regards income, there was a sort of. "external proletariat" made up.of. 
smallholders and urban subproletarians whose marginality became more obvious as 
the average income of the population^rose, while those groups that were integrated1 
into the system experienced the ambivalence of alternating stages of. progress and 
regression as regards participation in the fruits of economic growth. 
The society to which the Latin American type of. development-gave rise is a 
rather contradictory synthesis, of some of the features of the so-called society of 
masses and some features of. what was known in. the past as the dual society. It is 
characterised, on the one hand, by poverty and by the existence of a relatively 
undefined mass made up of the subordinate classes of the. rural and urban areas and-, 
on the other, by the more integrated and better differentiated structure: of the 
internationalized sectors of the system of production, both in the country and;in 
the city. The two, of course, are not independent of each other, as there are 
links between them; often,; however, there is an. unresolved .tension between the two 
contradictory elements.4/, . . •• 
In this context, we must ask what are- the salient features of. the social 
classes and groups to which the young people of the: region belong? ,, Theoretically,, 
it is generally, agreed that in order for social classes and groups to exist as real 
groups — o r :as definite collective entities— there must be. differences among 
them based oh a. given lifestyle as regards work and society. This means to a 
certain extent, that there must be a typical universe as regards culture, and 
relationships. Moreover, social classes and groups may also be described as real 
groups in terms of the way in which the spheres of production and of social 
reproduction are linked together in their daily lives. 
As regards forms of social stratification, the following transformations 
—with, certain differences from country to country— have been noted in the. region: 
'/There is a diversification of peasant groups as a result of the- development . 
of forms of agrarian exploitation other than the traditional- combination of 
latifundia and minifundia and the penetration of activities of the- modern 
capitalistic type. 
The recession brought about by the crisis greatly affected the situation of 
urban industrial workers;; moreover, there is great diversity within this group as 
regards wage levels,. forms of organization, types of qualification, etc. This 
sector is also different from the* so-called "informal sector", which in many cases 
is much larger. 
Among the middle sectors, it is now almost trite to make a distinction 
between the old middle class and, the new middle, class when speaking of the growing 
importance of certain new key groups, including the techno-scientists and the 
techno-bureaucrats, in both .governmental and private activities.. 
As regards the entrepreneurial groups, an agricultural entrepreneurial 
sector has arisen which, has become increasingly -important and has displaced the 
old rural oligarchy. Decisive changes have also taken place in relationships . 
between financial and industrial entrepreneurs or between financial and commercial 
/entrepreneurs. In 
- n _ 
entrepreneurs. la many cases, the particular type of economic model being applied 
has given financial capital a preponderant role, thus subordinating other sectors 
to the financial sector. It must not be forgotten that the entrepreneurial sector 
is linked to the exterior and that this increases its dependency and has an effect 
on the general orientation of the economy. 
As usual, however, what is important in speaking of social classes and groups 
is:not only to describe the; situation of each one, but also to point out the 
structure of relationships among them. Most diagnoses on Latin America agree on 
the significance of the fact that the development model followed after the Second 
World War has been exhausted or transformed and that a change has taken place as 
regards the form of industrialization. The crisis of the development model is 
also evident at the social level, as there is a crisis in relation between social 
groups and classes. 
One interesting phenomenon is the influence which the processes of 
structuring and destructuring of classes have within the cultural environment. In 
societies-with a longstanding class structure, such as most Of the European ones, 
there are three types of culture, i.e., the culture of the élite, that of the 
dominant groups and a popular culture. These different cultures, however, have 
tended to blend into each other; in some cases, this phenomenon has been attributed 
to the development of a level middle-class society. It was expected that a similar 
phenomenon would occur in Latin America if the effects of the industrialization 
and urbanization process which began right after the Second World War continued 
without interruption. However, it seems that in Latin America there has instead 
been a dissolution of previous identities rather than the emergence of a single 
new cultural pattern; this has been the case despite the visible tendency to 
adopt cultural consumption patterns characteristic of a degraded mass culture. 
This process is particularly complex in the Latin American countries not 
only because the type of development directed towards import substitution and 
urban expansion took place within a short time span, usually from the end of the 
Second World War —-except for a few cases in which it began simultaneously with 
the crisis of 1929— to the 1970s (since which time a new modality of industrial-
ization has begun in some countries), but also because it is impossible to speak 
of a clearly structured prior situation.5/ 
The society that existed before the model mentioned above was characterized 
by the coexistence, both in time and in space, of different social times; in oth$r 
words, there were groups which lived in extreme poverty, forms of agrarian 
relations which involved master-servant' relations, and several other modalities 
of economic and social relations. Urban structures were also extraordinarily 
complex, there being nuclei of a commercial and financial bourgeoisie with close 
links to the exterior, middle sectors resulting from the aggregation of diffèrent 
groups and, alongside craftsmen and incipient nuclei of workers, a "plebeian 
population", the latter term not being used in a pejorative sense. 
The process of industrialization which took place after the Second World War 
(in some cases earlier and in others later) actéd upon this complicated social 
structure and., although in each case this entailed phenomena of acculturation, 
destructuring and re struct uring of group identities and cultural systems, it must 
/be borne 
be borne in mind that, because of the nature of the social structure in question, 
these identities hardly bore any relation to an overall framework of- orientation ., 
of social action. 
, Nevertheless, industrialization.had, and.in many cases, still has an enormous 
impact as regards social,mobilization .and mobility, both, geographical. —internal 
migration, ^ s a sipiifi<?ant phenomenon, in- many countries, of the region— and 
occupational* J .Y7-...., 7J '. •-..:"••• .; 
The difficulties encountered,by the classes in trying to establish themselves 
as "real groups" —some of the elements of which we have tried to out linear- have 
certain specific effects, many of which directly concern youth. For example, a 
specific social group.jnay be considered capable of promoting, processes .of change 
and bringing new dimensions to history; moreover --as the French, sociologist Alain 
Touraine has pointed oiat in many of his theoretical works— a social group may be 
defined as a social movement to the extent that it perceives itself aa being the 
bearer of a historical;, opt ion. Thus, although it is common in Latin America, for . 
youth to refer to themselves in terms of their social status, e.g., "young worker", 
"young peasant", etc., only rarely do they see their social class as being an agent 
of history. This may help explain why there is a predominance in Latin American 
politics of pluriclass movements, with populism being only one of ..the most notable 
examples. 
Nevertheless, although class identities may ,be,difficult to establish, this 
in no way means that social differences have disappeared; on the contrary, new 
differences have totally or partially replaced the previous ones. Moreover, if 
class identities do not exist, there is a tendency to strengthen distinctions based 
on status. Indeed, several studies show how. the educational system, which appears 
to have an equalizing influence, introduces differentiations,even within a given 
level, thus giving, rise to different.statuses. . This. is. especially evident in the 
differences that are established between private and public education.or between 
different types of .universities. , 
As is well known,, the process of industrialization in.,Latin America went, 
hand-in-hand with a profound process of secularization,. Many different factors . 
acted as powerful incentives for the social mobilizations brought about by rural-
urban migration, incorporation into the urban environment or mass education. . In 
many cases it was not possible to establish as shared values ideas such-.as those, 
concerning the formation of the nation on the basis of social apd political 
participation or the extension of citinzenship. A good example of the difficulty 
encountered in establishing social values as the industrialization process went 
on is the fact that, for a long time, the notion of development.which, of course, 
implied both modernization.and nationalism, was only conceived,, even in technical, 
proposals, in terms of economic growth.. In recent years, when, the idea of growth 
seemed to be confined, as a general formula, to that of access to "consumption", 
the incentive was to gain access to the world, of .merchandise. . . . . . 
. As the nation-building project became generalized, it, allowed for.the 
development of mechanisms that would help .foster social integration. The idea of 
generalizing access, to the world of merchandise was too fragile..a mechanism to 
/sustain the 
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sustain the social integration that was necessary, and when the possibility of 
increasing the amount of goods that could be consumed was exhausted, and.even if 
it was only maintained, social integration was seriously impaired. Moreover, the 
legitimacy of many regimes also depended on the economic success they envisaged 
or achieved, independently of whether or not they achieve national social and 
economic integration, so that economic difficulties inevitably affected their 
legitimacy. In brief, the crisis aggravated certain effects which may be considered 
as socially damaging because the development pattern, adopted did not promote 
participation, impaired solidarity and lacked elements that would mobilize the 
people collectively. 
The above leads us to an interesting issue. Obviously, crises are not an 
unfamiliar phenomenon, either in the experience or in the development patterns of 
contemporary economies; however, societies have often overcome them and, in some 
cases, have even strengthened themselves, on the basis of a culture, an ethic and 
a feeling of national solidarity that are inherent to industrial society. This was ; 
the case of the European societies, which dealt ..with their postwar experiences in 
that way. 
One may question whether there were in Latin America social, political and 
cultural forces viiich, in fostering growth, could have led to the establishment of 
an industrial culture, providing an ethic and a "meaning" in the Weberiaii meaning 
of the word, while at the same time generating a feeling of identity and solidarity 
among the different members of the nation. 
Although many of the social sectors which played and are playing a leading 
role in the economy, especially the,entrepreneurial sector (in the broad sense of 
the word) and related groups., did. foster growth, they did so to protect those 
cultural traditions, orientations and value systems" which, paradoxically, would 
inevitably be eroded by growth itself. .This is not the place to go into detail 
on the implications of such a phenomenon or even of .the. degraded forms of behaviour . 
to which it sometimes led. What is important is to stress the fact that it has 
a great deal to do with the tremendous impact which the economic crisis has had 
on the structures which guarantee social integration. 
If we were to try to express all the above in a few words, we might say that 
neither the social structures nor the value systems and standards of the Latin 
American countries are firmly established and that so far all efforts to achieve 
this goal have either failed or only partially succeeded. It is hard to describe 
as types the forms of society existing in most Latin. American countries, not so 
much because of any conceptual difficulty as because of the intrinsic nature of 
these societies, an underlying difficulty in the reality itself. The question of 
youth cannot be considered independently of this reality. 
One characteristic of Latin America is the speed and depth of the changes it 
has undergone. Nonetheless, structural change usually leads to social 
disorganization, political unrest and a search —often precarious and hazardous— 
for new values and models. If we bear in mind that in most countries of the region, 
the industrialization cycle has only lasted a little over three decades, we may 
/easily draw 
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easily draw the conlusion that it is the young people who have benefited most from 
the unquestionable.successes which this has brought with it, but also that they 
have suffered the mpst from the upheavals that have inevitably occurred* 
' -2* Youth, change and institutions 
The process described above gave rise to a new type of relationship with 
institutions —in the broad sense of the word— such, as work and education, and 
with social patterns such as consumption. This involved the breakdown of existing 
social and cultural barriers; suffice it to mention the significance of crossing 
the barrier of illiteracy. This is not to say that such barriers disappeared 
entirely or that new ones were not raised up, but that those individuals who did 
manage to become incorporated, —and they were many— enjoyed greater social rights, 
both in: quantitative and'in qualitative terms, and that.the foundations of social 
inequality were modified. ... 
•Young.people are often the main actors in these processes and, as the 
processes continue operating, are greatly affected by them. The situation is now 
further complicated by the crisis in respect of growth and the development' model 
mentioned above. 
It would be interesting to make a detailed study of how consumption, both 
material and cultural, has spread, buts unfortunately noit much information is 
available on this subject. Mention is often made of a certain standardization of 
consumption, as in the case of the cultural consumption fostered by the mass 
communications media, or of access to. certain forms of clothing or even to 'certain 
articles such as r>adio receivers or others. . Although, in. many Latin American 
countries this only applies to certain segments of the population, what is 
important in the dissemination of consumption —with all the limitations mentioned 
above—• is the fact that, a change takes, place in the subjective orientation of 
the action; in other words, .the.relationship between the person's life on the job 
and his. life off the. job changes. In a study on Brazil, for example, it was noted 
that families even encouraged youth to .enter the job market at an early age, as a 
way of enabling them to have access to the consumption to which they aspire.6/ 
It, has often been, said, t.hat a. distinctive element of the traditional . 
thinking of the working class was to attach a positive value to work as a creative 
activity. The! overvaluation of consumption,, on the other, hand, leads people to . 
considep. work only as a .means of gaining,.an endf. in this case, it would be gaining 
access to consumption. Thus, work will be viewed as more or less worthwhile 
depending on whether it opens up greater or lesser possibilities of purchasing 
consumer goods. Hence., anything that serves as an efficient means to this end 
will be considered valuable. 
Evidently, the dissemination, or perhaps more than.that, the pressure of 
consumption and the actual possibility of gaining access to it breaks down 
—relatively speaking— the link between life in society and the true foundation 
of social differentiation, which is closely associated with functional and 
professional .differentiation. Thus, mention is often made of the difficulty of 
establishing the differences between certain strata of the middel sectors and 
certain strata of the worker sector, especially if one considers income levels, . 
which are what provide access to consumption. 
/If we 
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If we were to consider in greater depth the different aspects involved in the 
notion of crisis, we could distinguish between the purely economic aspects, with 
which we are perhaps most familiar at present, and other aspecta which have to do 
with the fundamental mechanisms which guarantee the social and cultural reproduction 
of the society. The crisis with respect to the. latter aspects may date from much 
longer ago and be much more complex than the economic crisis. Likewise, we must 
also stop and think about the crisis affecting the ideological structures or values 
vdiich gurantee the psychological and the psychosocial integration of individuals 
in the community. It is a question not only of being able to live, work and study, 
but also of ensuring that such activities are meaningful.. 
This, in fact, is what enables us to determine the true nature of a crisis in 
those socialization processes in which educational institutions and the family 
play a ma j or-role. The process of.-socialization establishes an individual's 
identity and the ethical standards, ideology and cultural values which give 
meaning to his own life and which ensure the cultural and ethical reproduction of 
society. Education, on the other hand, refers, to the mechanisms which enable young 
people to acquire the knowledge and capacity they need in": order to be able to, 
contribute to the material reproduction of society. 
Thus, perhaps one of the most interesting phenomena occurring in times of 
generalized crisis is that how young people relate to institutions, these being 
understood in the broad sense as, among others, school, family and job. It is a 
fact that many young people from different strata of society are excluded from 
the various institutions mentioned above; it is also true, however, that youth 
often make demands which the institutions, given current conditions, are not in a 
position to meet. 
Inclusion in schooling or higher-levels of the educational system —even, in 
some cases, universities— does not necessarily mean inclusion, in the world of 
culture and professional activity. Moreoever, at certain levels of education, 
youth are clearly deprived of certain material and spiritual advantages. 
Many studies have shown that, as a result of the crisis the family has become 
a world in which youth are practically obliged to remain. As regards the economic 
difficulties arising from the crisis, the family provides a sort of insurance to 
which a young person must frequently: resort . It is thus an element of economic 
stabilization; it is not clear, however, whether this is beneficial for older 
youth who need a certain degree of independence. 
Exclusion from the job market is obviously aggravated by the crisis and 
even those who are not entirely excluded from it may often be only partially or 
sporadically included. As is well-known, in times of crisis, it is the new 
generations who have the greatest difficulty in finding work. 
Exclusion from work in times of crisis .does not only affect youth from the 
blue-collar or popular sectors in general; although it is true that this phenomenon 
occurs more frequently among them, in some countries of the region, white-collar 
unemployment is beginning to be quite common, at least in some cases. Young people 
graduating from universities are not able to find jobs in the professions for 
which they were trained, and sometimes they do not find any job at all. 
/While occupational 
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While bctíupatíbnáL mobility wàs a characteristic of the industrialization 
period, the préséntfsituation poses serious problems. It appears thât j'at present, 
"entry revel" or, in some cases, non-entry, has a more decisive effëct thart it . • 
used to òri a person's professional and social future. Moreover, it'Wéems that in 
some cases there is less mobility, and promotion within the company is sióWer. 
This has been the case with blue-collar workers, but the changes in how promotions 
are made have also extended to other areas. Advancement from a job as a "day-worker 
to one as a specialized worker and then "to a Skilled worker depends not so'much on 
any skillsor experience théworker migjht acquireon the job as on training 
received through a formal programme; outside the'job.' ' Something similar is 
happening in respect 6"fv university-level professions,- whefe access to a career "-v 
depends more and more on post-gradúate studies, Master's dègrées, dóctóral degrees 
and others which have to be'obtained by interrupting the actual•exercise of the • 
profession. , • • • • •''" • ••.••••.•-•.• 
In extreme situations —which, however, must be seen as a warning signal for 
the region as a whole— thè main difference as regards the society in general, and 
youth in particular, is between the employed and the unemployed. Many' young • ; ' 
people see themselves as being excluded from work as well as from other ¿ 
institutions. In extreme cases, an awareness based on a dialectical relationship' • 
between different groups or sectors of society may be replaced by an awareness of 
exclusion based on the opposition between included and excluded persons. At the 
same time, those who qualify as "included" may haw an awareness òf being itì a 
privileged position and act mainly to protect that status. •"' " • ' ; 
Along with this' áVareness of exclusion, there is also, inmanycases, a 
certain feeling of fellowship which may be compared to that âssdciâted with the 
idea of a ghetto, with all the implications that has. It is true, óf course,' 
that in this phenomenon, many circumstances are at work, such as thé efforts of 
primary groups to restore the values that seem to have been degraded in the 
overall society and a defensive solidarity which accentuates the search for 
security"based on interpersonal acquaintances. Also, and this is probably very 
important, there is an uncertainty about the future of society which reinforces 
the need to seek satisfaction in fellowship. 
/3. The 
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3. The question of young people's commitment to democracy 
The difficult situation faced by young people, which was described in the preceding 
section, naturally gives rise to an interest in formulating proposals and 
suggesting forms of action to change that situation,, bearing in mind that the 
behaviour, attitudes and orientations of young people are vital factors in the 
consolidation or preservation of a stable democratic order in the region,. 
Attention has often been drawn to the .¡capacity for/resistance shown by , 
groups of young people, •; -This resistance has been/associated with aspects of the 
current economic situation, and phenomena such as their exclusion from employment 
or the failure to utilize their intellectual capacities have been cited in order 
to account for such behaviour. Thus, for example, in the case of the student 
disturbances of the 1960s and early 1970s, it was said that one of the motivations 
for these young students' actions was connected.with the difficulties which the 
universities were already having^in perpetuating the rapid social;mobility which 
access to higher education had made possible in the past. 
It was also noted that their, rebellious behaviour was often expressed in. . 
extreme forms of radicalized participation which, paradoxically, coincided with 
the relative inability of existing political organizations to integrate and 
channel their aspirations and demands. .<•;.-: 
Other.interpretations of the same phenomenon postulated that youth as such 
is a particular state of being characterized by psychological or other traits 
which are an inherent part of a certain stage in life. 
The problem was to identify the reasons why .young.people, at certain points • 
in time, appeared to have a dissociative effect on the political order. In most 
cases, these concerns were actually in reference to students and applied only 
tangentially to "young workers" or to the young people in other social groups. 
The question now is whether or not there is a set of specific, 
characteristics associated with young people in Latin America which, while not 
entirely removing class differentiations, would allow young people as such to 
contribute to the process of consolidating and strengthening democracy in the 
region. 
Two negative factors may hinder the achievement of these goals. One is the 
above-mentioned phenomenon of exclusion, which is obviously exacerbated by the 
crisis; the other relates to the difficulties which in many cases hamper the 
mechanisms for mediating between the demands of various sectors and decision-making 
centres. Under those regimes which have suspended political activities, any such 
system of mediation —not just political parties— are obviated almost by 
definition. In other cases, these mechanisms appear to be overly politicized and 
it is difficult for intermediaries to function. Due to all these factors, 
mediatory institutions or groups in most of the region are generally weak. The 
situation tends to be worse in the case of young people, and the only exceptions 
to this rule —and then only in some cases— are stundent organizations. It may 
therefore be said that young people are excluded to a certain extent from decision-
making; this is all the more true in respect of young people belonging to social 
/groups which 
groups which aré in a disadvantaged position' from'this standpoint, as is the case 
with urban marginal sectors, the peasant subproletariat, etc. 
Ih sitùëtiotis whei% a given group is exóludéd* it is difficult" for that 
group • t¿f:gáin â- clear view of events or to identify1 a counterpart to which it. 
can address' its ' demands ; The social order (ò*v'fno±'ie specifically, those political/; 
instituti'oiiàl' éléments giving rise to such exclusion) is usually perceived as an 
adversaity.v> As: a ^ number of studies havè shown,: it- Së diffictolt for young people , 
to organise either the - political - ofc- uniótt lève! -'üh'der :s'uch conditions, and 
they are-Excluded from the social relations which¡could serve as a basis for 
negotiation;' Thé possibility of formulating-"a strategy appears to be very reinóte, 
and this lé áds'to passivity ân:d withcbPai«iL'"orv,troi-'aemañd8--ta'- "-haver-'it all right 
now". '  ' •< •,'--••• •:• --'..'i-.:, v- .• • --vs^  v • ', n: '. • 
This type of situation therefore leads to a feeling of exclusion and, 
marginality which has been imposed from without in both structural and ideological 
terms» Institutional exclusion,1 thef^ prabletóS- ¡eftcotttitered' iiPfblndng' representative 
structures, and 'thé'difficulty of identifying^ cbimterpart-influence the attitudes 
of yoúng- people. The' sráciál 'órder -is ^ largely a system'of-; regulated participation 
and conflict, and in the eafâe Which is of'cohcern to us here ¿neither conflict nor 
participation is possible; uhfort\màtely,- such groups have no choicé but tò take . 
refuge in their private lives, in passivity* ánomie or violence. 
Undeir such conditionsi" it: i-s; ektremeiy-difficult for adolescents and young 
people tó acquire an "internal- identity" 'the society in which they find themselves 
is often a highly disaggregated one and it frequently lacks "meaning" on a principle 
that would truly permit the integration of its members. 
Under suòh circumstahcíes (and the- crisis greatly èxàcet'bates this situation), 
young people often feel- â gréât1 deal of uncertainty, abotit the future; in some 
cases, this leads them-to torni a'tjyfce òf-adolescent subculture through which they 
attempt to assume a pérnànènt' -i dènti ty, Respite thé fact that yòuthtis a temporary 
state by.définition ànd that" it ' isV indeed, only a beginning. - •• •'. 
The importance of young people in defining the regiones options 
In a recent study on yòuthV'it is' argued that young people are the main point of 
cultural conflict in so die ty. This1 focus is a particularly Valid* "one in the:-. • . 
history of the Latin American countries, as is shown by the far-reaching political 
role that has been played by student movements in the region.7/ Moreover:, the 
greatest concentration1 ;of people is currently to be found in educational centres 
and especially universities*, whose population is much greater than that of any • 
industrial enterprise; this gives the proposals coming from such'sources the; -
power of ñumbérs. '• ;:.•-•<•-..-. -....- ';-.-•„• 
In thé above-mentioned study, it is maintained that .what appears to-be a 
conflict of interests in society takes the form of a conflict of meaning among 
young peoplé. • v . . 
/As a 
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As a result of the process of social modernisation, which began to show its 
greatest dynamism following the Second World War, social conflicts as a whole 
took place in reference to the opposing tenets of traditionalism and modernism 
although, strictly speaking, such an opposition began to arise in ideological 
terms some time before that point, and the youth movement played an important role 
in that development. Looking back at the social movements associated with the 
1918 university reform .in CSrdoba and in other locations immediately thereafter, 
it may be seen that the rebelliousness of young people within the confines of the 
university focussed on oligarchic decision-making structures, the existence of 
narrow standards and values, the lack of dynamism;and the presence of extreme 
inequality. Their criticism was not only directed at the university, however, but 
also took in the entire society. These were ongoing issues during the process of 
social modernization and they served to crystallize a large part of the ideological 
basis from which not only young people, but the whole of society, addressed such 
conflicts. 
The transformation which took place, as lias already been noted, brought with 
it the e>$>ansion of education, a broader dissemination of information .through the 
mass media, the growth of domestic markets and rapid.urbanization. All of this 
involved collective mobility on a very large scale, as well as an awareness that 
mobility primarily depended on structural changes; in many cases, large group's 
supported the processes of transformation as a result. 
How can we define the cultural conflict which currently exists in society 
in an attempt to understand, on that basis, the possible orientations of youth 
movements? 
The phenomenon of exclusion referred to earlier was not unrelated to the 
opposition between traditionalism and modernism, and constant reference was made 
to the virtual political, social, cultural and economic exclusion of various 
groups and sectors of society. Nonetheless, in.view of the dynamism of moderniza-
tion, based on growth, it was thought that this type of exclusion, .would not be 
a permanent feature of society. This gave legitimacy to the efforts made to 
bring about modernization and to the regimes that were committed to those processes, 
even though exclusion continued. 
The present dichotomy between those who are included and those who are 
excluded is set within the context of a type of economic and social transformation} 
which entails the exclusion even of some groups which were previously included; ¡ 
moreover, such exclusion seems to be taking on an appearance of permanence., Although 
this is a major problem, not all the options have been exhausted, and perhaps y 
the situation need not be seen in terms of an extreme dichotomy. Indeed, the 
phenomenon of exclusion/inclusion, although it affects some sectors much more 
than others, cuts vertically across the social pyramid, and the reactions of each 
group thus affected are sufficiently varied to make it unlikely that those who 
are excluded will forra a group identify vis-a-vis those who are included. 
Mention has already been made of the heterogeneity of the Latin American 
social structure, which is manifested in every sector, including entrepreneurial, 
industrial, financial, commercial or agrarian groups, as well as middle-income, 
/working-class, 
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working-class, low-income urban and peasant sectors. Each group's reactions to 
the modality of economic and social development and its effects, or to the crisis 
of development, may be-ó'f¿an entirely defensive nature; this defensive attitude 
may place the group in question in opposition to another social group which is 
perceived as a threat. Attitudes may also be held which, regardless of the fate 
of others, are based on the positive factors that the group, as such, sees in the 
process of change. There will also be attitude's of rebelliousness as regards the 
position which a group perceives itself as occupying. 
In some sectors, individual âspirationâ of mobility will prevail, while in 
others the general tendency may be to adopt à passive or indifferent attitude. 
There may well be instances oif anomic behaviour, mâinly among those who are 
excluded, and violence may be'the approach takéh'by sómé of those occupying a 
defensive position as well as by thosé1 who have Chosen-'to rebel. In all these 
cetses,- 'with the possible ' exception of those in 'whffch highly individualistic or 
extreitfôlyranomic behaviour predomina te s-, primary links òf solidarity are reinforced 
which; nonetheless i ate marked by an absericë ; of bWtfall social soÎidai>ity.: As-
previously stated, howevër,'the phehomèrion which'toày^ have thé farthest-reâôh'ihg 
implications is that typé of orientation whose hâïlmârk' is its anti-institlitionality 
or, at least, an alienation from the institutional structure. 
We might well- ask otfrsèlves what types of Action- can -be taken to overcome 
the contraposition between those included and those excluded aiid how this might 
come about; Certainly, the processes referred toearliëràre of a-greater òr 
lesser intensity ^ 'depending upon the particular chaMcteMstics'of-the social ând'-
economic process in each oountry-' óf- the ¿région;-'-' ':THé national Studies. Which -havé 
been carried out for presentation at the second regional meeting discuss these 
specific features ¿'--but it can be àrgtiéd thaf! mâiiy of thé phénomëna;--'in question,^  
although they vaïy-'ià' Ì4àtèn:sity9-:-^ ?e''gett:eriò;tò*---tl,ie tfegiottv : 
In additi oïi'^  however J the sltïfatib'n of 'young people'in.•--'the' region 'iS'Setr 
within the context of its sdciétieS and they, in turn/ are part 'of a system - f • • 
international politicali economies Scientific,- technological and OUltùralrelationsv 
An :issue which transcends thd stringent economic conditions and indebtedness 
faced by the region in its relations with the 'World centres is the•scientific and 
technological transformation occurring in thé centres and the impact which this 
will have on the development and social organization of the region.* • 
At the level of national societies* scientific and technological dependence 
can mirror the relationship existing between those who are included and those who 
are excluded, which was discussed in connection with various groups of young 
people. '•'- ; ••'•• '• • ' 
There is a considerable degree of :uncertainty about the future, but it seems 
probable -that there will be a progressive scientific interpénétration of societies,' 
culture and production, thè challenge now faced by the region is that of preparing 
coming generations to participate in this.scientific culture, in terms of both 
natural and social sciéiìces. If this is to occur., sweeping changes will have-to 
be made'not'only in the orientation of 'its educational systems, but in cultural 
patterns^  as well. Science demands social rationality and it cannot be regarded as 
an enclave technology*' 1 i- , 
, /This dimension 
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This dimension of the transformation of cultural and scientific patterns 
once again points up the problem of extending these patterns to new générations, 
thus lending even greater urgency to the problem of the inclusion of young people. 
II. YOUNG PEOPLE AND POLITICS 
Whatever portion of the Latin American "countries' political history one may choose 
to examine, young people have almost always played a part in it. Not only the 
years of the 1918 Córdoba reform, but many decisive,-momènts in Latin American 
history as well have been marked by young people. Although it is true that, in 
most instances, the.young people involved were represented by student movements, 
these were not the only movements which were active,, but merely the most identifiable 
ones. The political visibility of young people is a fact which:contrasts with the 
assertions-frequently made as to young people's disinterest in politics. As always 
occurs, there is some truth to both of these contradictory assertions.' In many 
cases, it is not that young people are alienated from ..politics, but rathe* that 
the ways in which politics are conducted either bypass them or do not attract 
them. This is perhaps the reason why their presence is much more clearly manifested 
at times when political styles and modes are breaking down or being redefined, or 
perhaps it is because their way of engaging in politics is to promote the processes 
of political change. Either of these two attitudes --that of abstaining from 
participation or, on the other hand, that of activism-- may therefore manifest, 
itself, depending on the overall circumstances in each case. 
In addition to determining the extent of young people's participation in , 
politics, it is also important to ascertain the degree to which young people are 
committed to democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean and, especially in these, 
times of crisis in the region, to determine the extent to which their demands aré 
realistic* Clearly, young people's realism and commitment to' democracy riot only 
hinge upon an express willingness on their part to adapt their behaviour to those 
objectives. In many cases, institutional democracy becomes distorted in social 
practice; young people are extremely sensitive to this sort of contradiction, and 
may come to mistrust political institutions as a result. At this point, it may 
be helpful to review what was said at the beginning of this paper in regard to 
the possible forms which young people's anti-institutional behaviour may take. 
Social determinants of political participation 
Obviously, there are specific historical circumstances which go a long way towards 
accounting for the political processes and participation of young people in each 
given situation. Nonetheless, it should be borne in mind that the nature of., 
political behaviour and, in many cases, even the possibility of political 
participation are influenced by the level of development and —more than by the 
degree of economic development in a narrow sense— especially by the degree of 
social development that has been reached. This distinction must be kept in mind 
because, even if the indexes of economic development are eminently positive¿there 
may be serious shortcomings with respect to social development. Based on a study 
of social and economic indicators-, the countries of the region can be classified 
according to their level of social development using the data obtained from the 
- : /1970 censuses. 
1970 censuses.8/ The components of the social development indicator include 
variables which relate to education, health and housing.. These are weighted 
variables, with the greatest weight in this indicator being -given .to the; extent 
of illiteracy, medical attention and the; percentage of people, lacking formal „.••.••••-••' 
education in the economically active population;* According. to this classification, 
Argentina and Uruguay are in the first category; the second category is made up 
of Chile, Costa Rica, Panama and Venezuela; the third category is formed by Bolivia 
Brazil, Cplopfcia,. the Dominican Rep-iablie.v-Ecuador, Mexico.,,.,Paraguay and Peru; 
the. fourth category is composed of El-Salvador.Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. 
This classification provides an indication-of the persistent gaps between . 
a country's economic and social.development, in, for example,, the periods 1960-1970: 
and 1970-1980. Countries, such a,s..B?azil»r Colombia * Ecuador, Mexico and Panama had 
high growth rates (per capita gross domestic; product) in comparison to other 
countries of the region, but their level of social>development was not -as high. 
The above facts are relevant because the level of social development attained 
and perhaps the levelr;of education in particularhave an influence, on-the ; 
possibilities for political and social participation and, especially* >0n the 
capacity for autonomous and organized participation. Clearly, these are not the 
only determinants;, the processes of mobilizationwhich are involved in:nation-
building efforts or which are related to development,styles also often open the 
way to participation. - • ,-. ,..-!•: •-•-•;,...,-.. 
2. The concept of "political poverty" 
The concept,of "political poverty'' 9/ has been developed in connection with the 
subject of participation in an effort to explore the bounds within which 
participation may, take place. The original,..theory is; based on, the idea that power 
is a "scarce commodity" to which only some groups have access and that the distance 
separating a given group from it or the difficulties that a group encounters in 
gaining access to it are indications of t-he existence of "political poverty". In 
fact, there" are objective . determinants', "some"of rwhic-h-'vfer,e.'"firehtioried''earlier, that 
give rise to psychosocial attitudes marked By an abstention'from participation. 
People perceive themselves as lacking; the means to. .act, and this, prevents them . 
from establishing a social space and from sharing in a certain amount of power. 
The concept of political poverty, like the similar idea of.economic poverty, 
can be divided into absolute and relative poverty. The former would describe a 
situation in which there is a great deal of conscious or unconscious manipulation, 
while relative poverty would involve,a limited amount of manoeuvring room. 
Certainly, there are many spheres of political participation, but at least 
three which are of particular significance should be mentioned. Firstly, there 
is participation in civilian society, which entails the promotion of organizational 
capacity and a recognition of the social importance of historical forms of 
organization,-such as trade unions, parties, Co-operatives, cultural associations 
and many others. A second sphere of participation relates to the ability to 
intervene in the actions taken by the State, while, a third sphere concerns the 
ability to claim specific rights and to exercise -them. } 
/Those who 
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Those who suffer from political poverty are not organized, do not participate 
in decision-making processes, lack the means to pursue their objectives —and the 
level, quality and type of education they have received is of special importance 
in this connection—> have been invaded by cultural elemènts alien to them and are, 
in practice, unable to exercise their basic human rights. ; 
The author of the essay on this subject stresses thé influence which 
education has on the severity of political poverty in a given situation. In this 
regard, illiteracy might be regarded as representing the most extreme case in 
which the tools to overcome such poverty are lacking. Hence the importance of 
basic education, which, in addition to providing specific knowledge and skills, 
prepares people to exercise their rights as citizens; this is the light in which 
education has been seen by the social groups in Latin America that have called 
for the extension of basic education. 
Another important effect of political poverty is that it is a factor in the 
failure to renew a society's leadership; above all, it hinders the emergence of 
alternative leaders. 
Education, despite the fact that it is of decisive importance, is of course 
not the only factor. This is why a more complex indicator, which shows that 
political poverty may exist in many of the countries in the region, has been brought 
into the discussion. 
Another possible factor, in addition to the lack of tools, which may 
contribute to "political poverty" is that power may be exercised in a way which 
hinders or prevents it from being shared or exercised by others, thus depriving 
people or social groups that are capable of participating of the opportunity to 
do So. 
Young people's capacity for political change in situations 
where modernization is a. recent phenomenon 
It is interesting to note that, even in difficult situations such as those described 
above, important forms of political action are possible which can bring about change; 
in many cases, young people play a decisive role in the political development of 
society as a whole. 
The changes which have taken place in the structure of Latin American society 
have given rise to différent forms of organization, many of which have come into 
being only very'recently, and young people presumably play an important role in 
this connection. Young people will only be able to integrate themselves and 
overcome the factional divisions of older generations, however, if they have the 
capacity to participate. 
It should nonetheless be borne in mind that, in a sense, the political 
actions of young people can take on certain dimensions —and in some cases, extreme 
characteristics— of radicalization, but this is not a widespread phenomenon. Such 
radicalizatiori may instead relate to the nature of their demands, and this can have 
an impact on the political orientations and behaviour of society as a whole. • 
/In those 
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In those countries where urbanization continues to be an important process, 
social mobility was initially the-predominant orientation among immigrants to the 
cities; in some cases, however, economic, political and social circumstances 
hindered the realization of these aspirations. Frequently, the urban environment 
even became an adverse environment, and the hew working classes, in which yoiing 
people were the first urban generation, had to organize themselves in order to 
deal with the challenges of urban life. » • 
The identity formed primarily by urban working-class sectors came to be based 
on a principle of opposition to those who rejected them. The responsibility for 
this situation was frequently attributed to the government, and these elements 
became decisive factors in the orientation of political activities and behaviour« 
An examination of the course taken by the- economic and social process as it 
related to industrialization and urbanisation is helpful in understanding the 
present situation of young people and their behaviour. In those cases where this 
phenomenon is á relatively recent one, efforts -were made by such mobilized 'groups 
to expand social participation through unionization or conpunity devéloprnent, or 
it was. a result of State actions, such as the reform and expansion of5the educational 
system or other measures. Participation ih' a strictly political1sense was never-
theless more'difficult, and sotial participation" wás therefore1 not' in accord with 
political participation. 
Past experience, which may repeat itself, indicates that during times of 
increased constraints <du.e to the prevailing-economicconditions, crisis situations 
or a reduction in the dynamism of the model of industrialization), people are less 
willing to accept the- implications' ófe^áínded participation. Furthermore, a 
considerable deterioration in the living conditions of certain sectors leads them 
to express their discontent, and all"-'o'f'5 this results' in-an' increase ih social 
tension. Although in some recent caSéseffbrts to institutionalize' political life 
have been successful, t-he'-écbnotitic 'áitfc&tionv and-in'-son»™--festánces>-'-'the.;ecóhófflic- ' 
policy that-was applied made the living conditions of working-class and middle-
income sectors more difficult. Under süch circumstances, young people may become 
radicalized. •'< •' • •':'•'"•-
In some countries, political life has made a recovery- under extremely difficult 
economic conditions. Young people may reject a political system which, in their 
opinion, places too much value on'the púrély forthal aspects of politics. In other 
cases, an attempt is made to renovate party structures, and young people come to 
occupy important positions within them. 
The political orientation of young people is therefore quite closely linked 
to a drop in living standards, the cessation bf mobility and the ability shown by 
the political system to establish consensúa! forms bf distributing resources and 
opportunities. An interesting avenue-of inquiry is to determine what conditions 
lead young people to become apathetic or simply to reject the system, and what 




Political participation and social strata' 
Young people's participation in politics in Latin America takes different forms 
depending upon the social stratum or sector to which they belong. In those 
countries where industrialization is niore recent, a large percentage of workers 
are young people of migrant origins; përhaps precisely because of the importance 
taken on by their insertion, however, they tend to behave as workers rather than 
as "young people". Even the efforts made by union organizations to organize 
young workers as such have rarely produced positive results. 
Attention is often drawn to the excessive importance which has been 
attributed to university students, although this is now changing. University 
students have often demonstrated a great capacity for mobilization and a high 
degree of receptivity with respect to.a given nation's social problems. 
The prominent role of young university students is closely related to the 
fact that the universities have a symbolic value in many countries of the region 
and provide a point of reference for national life. Students generally have 
conflicts with the.university structure'itsélf, but these disputes rapidly become 
tinged with the global political conflict. University students are recognized as 
a political actor by society and the Universities séttvè'as a national political 
forum for politicians. 
As was said earlier, this situation has begun to change. Thé extension of 
access to the university to.a broader spectrum and the closer association with 
the masses which results have,, for many, diminished its identification with a 
prestigious elite. What has in fact, occurred' is that'thé various'specialized 
programmes of study and universities bave, becomè:stratified;'-and' the mere fact 
of being a student is therefore no longer.a privileged position iri arid'of itself. 
Furthermore, this stratification is quite cloisely linked to a certain quality of 
education which is oftentimes acquired prior to entrance into:the university, 
and it is the socially privileged sectors which have access to that level of! 
education. The elites thus formed are oriented towards à chain of powër, and 
their prestige is derived from this link, although this does not mean that they 
form an autonomous élite. Moreover, the universities' monopoly on knowledge 
has been affected by the emergence within society of centres of learning, research 
institutes and other institutions which are not necessarily linked in with thé 
society. 
In Latin America, the university used to fulfil the socially acknowledged 
role of "doing society's thinking", but there are now other entities which also 
perform this function. In addition, political movements have found other channels 
for disseminating their ideas and proposals, and the university has therefore 
ceased to hold a privileged position as a forum for debate. 
/5, Attitudes 
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5* Attitudes towards democracy and political institutions 
Young people's attitudes towards democracy is a question of "obvious importance. 
Unfortunately, there are very few empirical studies.which address this issue. 
In Bolivia, a journalistic survey of young people ir}- various social sectors was 
conducted which gathered information on their attitudes in.this regard. A total " 
of 27.5% of the survey respondents held a negative view of democracy; some of ' 
the arguments they,gave were that it was unjust to the people, held back development 
etc. Democracy was felt to be valid only under certain conditions by 24.6% of the 
respondentsj. the conditions being, for example,, "so long as it is used correctly", 
"provided that it is not demagogic", etc. Democracy was viewed positively by 
33.8%. 
There is a correlation between attitudes towards democracy.and attitudes 
towards politics; negative opinions such as "politics is run by a select few",, 
"politics is a fraud", etc., are not infrequent. This type of negative opinion 
affects young people's interest in politics. In the above-mentioned survey, 21.5% 
said that they were interested in politics; 49.2% said that they were not interested 
and 21.5% did not answer the question. Young people's image of political 
institutions, is frequently quite nega"tive-as well.. , 
Extreme cases of, apathy or political disinterest among young people are to 
be found in „the region. . - For example, when people abstain "f^ om voting, their 
absence of motivation is often due to political indifference, rather than to an 
express rejection of the system. . ' 
It is true that social-institutions such as the family, and the schools are 
not good settings for political sociaiization in these éaseáy biit' it is also true 
that parties have pot- formulated youth programmes,..nor have they demonstrated a 
capacity for the political., socialization of young people." , ' ; " • 
r 6..-.. ;The situation in those countries where modernization 
came early '.''."' 
In the.countries where modernization came about.early on, different factors have 
affected young people's political orientation, and behaviour', and these factors 
must be taken, into consideration. In some of these. , countries , 'there was what 
might be called a "structure of stable.roles", 'and the idea of institutionalizing 
people's careers faithfully mirrored this fact. The two major keys to possible 
promotion or individual mobility were formal education and seniority. This meant 
that young people had a long period to look forward to during which they would -
have to perform subordinate social roles within highly consolidated structures. 
For this reason, young people were .not often found to feel that that world they" 
faced was-a. closed.and oppressive, system. . ..This latent tension could become more 
intense and turn into open, conflict if,, the' economy" ceased, tp groW and the rigidity 
of the structure therefore became more oppressive.' To a large extent,' the 
rebellion of young people, if it can be so termed, was closely related to the 
rigidity of the social structure. 
/Student movements 
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Student movements took "on a great deal of importance, inasmuch as the 
reaction of students was an ideologized and highly symbolic expression of the 
nation's impatience with the rigidity of the political system and the frustrations 
of growth. To some degree, student agitation was closely related to the 
intellectuals' uneasiness and their conviction that it was possible to apply -
their knowledge and skills in a positive way. Since student conflicts also led 
to the emergence of differences of opinion among the upper strata of society, 
intellectuals —and the students among them— were faced with a contradiction.... 
between the high degree of training they possessed and the actual opportunities 
they had to use that training. This caused them to question the traditional poles 
of economic and political power. 
It should be pointed out, however, that not all young people questioned the 
system, and although they were not visible,' a large number of young people were 
conformists who, rather than being indifferent, implicitly accepted the existing 
values of society. 
7. Spheres of participation 
In those countries where modernization took place early, under normal conditions; 
there are certain spheres in which the participation of young people is significant, 
such as the student movement, social mobilizations and> even political parties.. On 
the other hand, there is relatively little participation in other ..spheres, such, as 
in both blue-collar and white-collar trade unions and in the media'that shape . 
public opinion. -, .• 
8. The family and political;socialization 
The experiericés of authoritarian regimes reveal an interesting fact. Such regimes 
were often preceded by extensive conflicts : in which young people took an active 
part. Attempts were subsequently made to repress those who had mobilized the 
conflict or who were trying to promote; options which diverged from those chosen 
by the regime, and these measures had a profound effect on young people. Families 
came to fear the consequences of young people's participation in public life and, 
due to the prevailing circumstances, young people themselves came to mistrust many 
State institutions. In self-defence, daily:life tended to focus on private affairs, 
and family ties were thus strengthened, to a certain extent, in comparison to other 
social ties. In those situations where democratic values were highly internalized 
into social consciousness, the family performed functions of socialization and 
preservation in some spheres, as well as safeguarding the cultural heritage from 
the effects of authoritarianism. In so far as participation, in society was 
concerned, there were severe limitations on political and intellectual activity, 
and the young people who overcame this type of situation were often only able to, 
do so because they were highly motivated and had a sufficiently sound family 
background. The socialization of political and cultural values, which.could 
not be manifested in other spheres, took place through the family. < 
/9. Social 
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9. Social inclusion and exclusion processes: 
their effect on political attitudes 
With reference to the inclusion and exclusion processes already mentioned, the 
behaviour patterns of young people in political matters are influenced by this 
distinction, and even their ways.of manifesting conflict are different. . . . 
Although in connection with youth one can speak of certain homogenizing 
effects both of education and.of "urban culture", the. impact, of segmentation is 
much greater than that of these factors. 
Young people who are excluded are powerfully affected by a situation of 
social disintegration which is often reflected in disruptive conduct.in a cultural 
void, much of which borders on a state of anomy. The marginated young suffer from 
experiences of disintegration, marked labour instability, unemployment and a 
breakdown in family cohesion which go. hand in hand with political exclusion, social 
disruption and in many cases the crumbling of collective solidarity. Here one 
might almost speak,of "political poverty", owing to a virtual expropriation. 
Among those who are integrated, certain traits of individualism might be 
accentuated, but in the attitudes of, many there are some signs of apathy and even 
of a degree of conservatism. Some types of conduct were observed which supported 
the idea of individual mobility; for example, for their professional training 
they chose options based on "instrvanentalisir' and specialization and displayed a 
general trait, already mentioned, of political apathy. Non-conformitywhen'it . 
existed among the groups, of . the "included", manifested itself basically as cultural 
resistance and a rejection of the system, of moral guidance. 
When the crisis became more marked, however, professionalism and the idea, 
of individual success lost its meaning, since in every sphere the possibilities 
of employment were restricted. These developments began to modify the behaviour 
of the "integrated" groups,., since their place in society was now much less clear. . 
Obviously the political attitudes of young Latin Americans vary greatly. 
There can certainly be no hasty generalizations on the subject, but some of the 
facts described might serve as a warning regarding, present and future challenges. 
/III. THE 
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III. THE DIVERSITY.OF SITUATIONS IN THE REGION 
1. Typification of social development situations 
The set of studies conducted on the situation of youth discloses that, although many 
problems may be considered common to the'different countries, the specific form in 
which they occur is closely associated with the peculiarities of each case, and it 
may even be that the ways in which they are solved depend on the particular 
contexts, where the concrete form in which the problem is interlinked with a given 
situation is fundamental to the achievement of an adequate response. 
The diversity of situations occurring in the region is an accepted fact; hence 
the need to work out typologies which take this phenomenon into account. The 
typologies may be purely descriptive, grouping countries and distinguishing them 
from others on the basis of certain parameters regarded as important, such as 
their degree of economic growth, their state of urbanization, their quality of 
life, education, housing or health, and other indicators. There are also more 
analytical typologies which attempt to group situations around certain processes 
regarded as being of key importance, such as the conformation of integrated 
national States, processes of social secularization and formation of articulated 
social relations, or other elements. 
As always, the value of a typology lies in its heuristic value, so that it 
contains a certain implicit arbitrariness which is only justified by the capacity 
for explanation inherent in the'typology. The object of this paper, rather than 
to develop a rigorous typology, is to attempt a differentiation that will exemplify 
the diversity referred to, though obviously the groupings proposed are open to 
question. 
A first group would be composed of countries like Brazil., Colombia and Mexico, 
which evolved rapidly from a predominantly agrarian social structure to one which 
is urban and industrial, as shown by the following figures. 
URBAN POPULATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF 
TOTAL POPULATION 
1950 1960 1980 2000 
Brazil 34.8 46.2 62.8 74.1 
Colombia 36.9 48.6 66.3 77.4 
Mexico 44.3 51.8 65.5 76.3 
Source: CELADE, projections based on the figures of population censuses. 
/These countries 
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The.se countries are also characterized by high demographic growth associated 
with high economic growth. The, annual average.growth of the per capita gross 
domestic product in the period 1970-1980, (in dollars at 1970 prices) was 6.1% in 
Brazil, 3.4% in Mexico and 3.3% in Colombia. . The. regional average .amounted, to 3.4%; 
other countries which 'exceeded the regional average were Ecuador, Paraguay and the 
Dominican Republic, It is interesting to note. ;that in the three countries in 
question the gross domestic product per. capita'more than doubled in .the period 
1950-1980'..' ' V ' . '._. .'.". 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT.PER CÀPITA 1950-1980 ,. 
(In 1970 dollars) 
,. .... ' 1950 -.: - 1980 
Brazil . ; . . .27.3 958 . -
Colombia 409. . ., 824 ... 
Mexico 513 1 366 
Source: ECL'AG, on the basis of official information. 
Despite this growth, however,; there tend'to be sharp dichotomies between the 
poles of development and the remaining regions, between the urban and rural zones 
and between the sectors included and those excluded in the process of modernization. 
It is of interest to compare the global- illiteracy-*-'rate's With • those'of the 
juvenile population. • v.--..-• .v ' - ' 
ILLITERACY RATES 
Country Year 
Population aged 15 years and 
over, 1980 -' 
Population aged 15 to 24 years, 
1980-
Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
Brazil 1980 . 25.5 16.8 46.3 16.1 . -8.5 : 33.6 
Colombia 1973 19.2 11.2 34.7 11.0 a/ 5.9 22.1 
Mexico 1980 17.-0 5.9 -1-8.9 8.1 b/ • 2;1 9.1 
Source : ECLAC, on the basis of published census data. 
a/ Group 15-19 years. 
b/ Urban corresponds to the Federal District and rural to the rest of the 
country. They represent respectively 15% and 85% of the population. 
/The figures 
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The figures illustrate the differences between the countries forming the 
category and are attributable to the application in Colombia and Mexico of more 
dynamic policies of mass education. . At the same time they reveal the important 
changes that are taking place in the literacy training.of the young, whose rate . 
in countries like Mexico is equal to half that of adults. In the more populated, 
countries of the region the polarization between rural and urban areas persists 
as regards the schooling of the new generations; in addition, the relative gaps 
between illiteracy rates increase among young people as a result of the more rapid 
incorporation into the educational system of urban than of rural youth. The latter 
find themselves left far behind because of the importance assigned to literacy in 
progressively urbanized and modernized societies. 
The countries cited experienced the greatest industrial growth in recent 
years and the growth rate of the economically active population in the secondary 
sector was higher than that of the tertiary sector. In general employment 
—although it slackened as a result of the crisis— has greatly increased as a 
result of the urbanizing process; even so, owing to the concentration of income, 
wages in some sectors are relatively low. 
A second group consists of countries such as Ecuador, Panama- and Venezuela, 
which also had high economic growth, rapid modernization and the active intervention 
of the State in the transformation of society. We must not forget the relationship 
established by the State with the petroleum economy in Venezuela or, in the case 
of Panama, with the Canal, or again the historic linkage between the State and 
society which has existed in Costa Rica. 
It should be noted that there were fluctuations in growth attributable to the 
impact of the external sector on the economy, as can be seen in comparing the 
differences between the growth rates of the gross domestic product in the 1960s : 
with those of the 1970s. 
GROWTH OF THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
Country 1960-1970 1970-1980 
Ecuador 1.7 5.7 
Panama 4.8 2,5 
Venezuela 2.2 0.5 
Source : ECLAC5 on the basis of official information.. 
/It is 
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It is also noticeable that modernization seems to improve the general 
situation of young people, as: has happened in Panama, Ecuador and Venezuela, where 
this process is more recent, if we compare the percentages.of illiteracy of the 
global population and of the young. 
ILLITERACY RATES 
Countries Year 15 yeärs and over 15--24 years 
Total Urban Rural Total Urban- Rural 
Costa Rica 1973 11.6 4.9 17.0 ' 5.2 1.9 7.8 
Ecuador 1982 16.4 6.2 27.7 6.6 2.4 11.8 
Panama 1.980 12.9 5.2 27.1 . 4.5. 2.3 9.6 
Venezuela 1981- 15.3 - - , 7.0 ... • n - . 
Source : ECLAC, on the basis of published census data. 
It is evident that the rates of the latter are below half those pertaining 
to persons over 15 years of age and in Panama they are almost,down to a third, 
which reflects the repercussions of the educational and social integration policies. 
However, the gaps between the urban and rural illiteracy rates of juveniles remain 
high —especially when cultural and linguistic differences are involved—although 
they are lower than those that, applied to the adult generation in those countries 
and —a very important factor— they are close to 8%, which signifies that in a . 
few years juvenile illiteracy will be a residual problem.. 
The situation in Costa Rica is differentsince it made an early start with 
modernization in a society with urban and rural,integration and more.equitable 
patterns of income distribution; hence its literacy indicators are higher and the 
gaps between urban and rural rates tend to diminish, so that on the basis of the 
former it can be said that practically the whole population has had basic 
education. 
Bolivia and Peru constitute a third type': their economic growth is relatively 
weak and the growth rate of the. gross domestic product between 1950 and 1980 was 
1.8% in Peru and. 1.9% in'Bolivia. Ih the 1970s this rate was 0.5% in the former 
of these countries and 1.9% in the latter. The growth of the per capita gross 
domestic product9 measured in dollars at 1970;prices, was likewise low in that 
period, rising from US$ 408 to US$ 690 in Peru and 276 to 382 in Bolivia; " 
The modernization•that took place was basically: centred on urbanization and 
educational development. The migrations from rural to urban zones or to areas of 
greater economic dynamism, as in Boliva, are of extraordinary significance. The 
/cultural dualism 
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cultural dualism deriving from ethnic differences acquires great importance and 
hence the main issue would seem to be the problem of national integration, which 
in its turn underlines and points up the importance of the political situation. 
ILLITERACY RATES 
Countries Year 15 years and over 15--24 years 
Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
Bolivia 1976 37.3 16.0 53.0 17.3 5.3 28.2 
Peru • 1971 • 17.4 7.7 37.7 6.6 2.0 17.3 
Source : CELADE, projections based on population census figures. 
Peru was the first to transform its education, which has been completed in 
recent years with the incorporation of the population of school age, reflected, in 
the fall of 20 points in illiteracy among adults and juveniles in rural areas. 
The global indicator of juvenile illiteracy links it with the countries in the 
previous category where there was a rapid transition in education. 
Bolivia also registered a fall of 20 points in the global illiteracy rate 
for young people as compared with adults, and even more in the rural population, 
but its indicators are still, high. . 
The important element in both countries is the role of education as an 
integrating process in the context of relatively low economic growth and 
differentiation in the labour market, representing a situation of cultural 
mobilization of youth in a relatively rigid economic structure. 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay are characterized by their early modernization 
in comparison with the region as a whole, and this is demonstrated by their urban 
population percentages. 
PERCENTAGE OF URBAN POPULATION 
1950 1960 1980 
Argentina , 65.0 73.3 , 81.6 
Chile. 59.1 67.6 78.7 
Uruguay 70.5 77.7 83.8 




Despite this», their economic growth seems to have been much less dynamic than 
that of the other economies of the region. In the 1970s the growth of the gross 
domestic product was 0.8% in Argentina, 0.8% in Chile and 2.6% in Uruguay, while 
the regional average was 3.4%. If a longer period is. taken into account, e.g., 
1950 to 1980, the growth was 1.5% in Argentina, 1.5% in Chile and 0.5% in Uruguay. 
Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that these low growth rates are 
counterbalanced by a-relatively high per capita gross domestic product. In 1950 
the average per capita gross domestic product in the region was US$ 439, . 
whereas in Argentina it was US$ 859, in Chile 067 and in Uruguay 956; in 
1980 the regional average was 1 007, whereas in Argentina it was 1 345, in Chile 
1 047 and in Uruguay US$ 1 423.*/ . . 
The illiteracy rates are low for adults as well as for juveniles and are .now,., 
so low that they are difficult to eliminate entirely in urban areas, while in 
rural areas there remain small pockets of marginality. 
Owing to'the early urbanization'and the high urban coverage. the minimum 
educational levels now comprise the complete primary or'basic cycle. This goal 
was reached in 1980 by 80% of juveniles aged 15-24 years inArgentina .(seven years 
of primary education);, 79% of their. Chilean counterparts ( bas i c.cy c le' of; ei'ght 
years) and 81% of Uruguayans in the same age group (primary schooling of'six years' 
duration). 
ILLITERACY BATES 
Countries Year 15 years and over 15--24 years 
Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
Argentina 1980 6.1 - - 3.1 - -
Chile a/ 1980 6.4 . 4.3 16.8 1.8 1.3 4.1 
Uruguay 1975 6.1 5.2 11.0 1.6 1.3 3.3 
Source•• ECLAC, on the basis of official information. 
a/ Instituto Nacional de Estadística (National Institute of Statistics - INE), 
National Employment Survey, Chile,.1980. 
The basic problems, which are found in several countries, are the crises of 
social and political participation, a very significant factor in the last decade 
and particularly in Argentina and Uruguay , where there is a certain tendency towards 
a crystallization of society, i; e.5 the reproduction in the young generation of, , 
the trends and differences that, already existed in the intermediate generation 
and even in that of 'their parents. This crystallization is expressed in diminished 
mobility in the labour and educational fields. 
M. . /The Central 
£/ All the figures are expressed in dollars at 1970 prices. 
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The Central American countries, excepting Costa Rica, are notable for the 
size of their agricultural population, even when their advances in urbanization 
are taken into account. The evolution of their urbanization has been as follows: 
PERCENTAGE OF. URBAN POPULATION 
1950 1960 1980 . 2000 
El Salvador 17.6 31.4 44.2 54.4 
Guatemala 27.0 30.6 36.5 43.1 
Honduras 20.0 " 23.9 38.8 53.0 
Nicaragua 33.2 39.9 53.8 66.0 
Source: CELADE, projections based on population censuses* • 
As will be seen, the percentage of rural population will continue high, even 
in the projection for thé' year 2000. 
The Options for growth in each of the countries, taking into account their 
size, are relatively weak, as shown by the growth rates of their per capita gross 
domestic product. 
GROWTH RATE OF PER CAPITA GDP 
1950-1980 1970-1980 
El Salvador 1.4 0.1 
Guatemala 1.9 . . 2.5 
Honduras 1.1 1.3 
Nicaragua 1.3 -1.9 
Source : ECLAC, on the basis of official information. 
The per capita gross domestic product has been low in relation to the 
regional average (US$ 1 007 in 1980). The figures in dollars for these countries 
in that year were: El Salvador, 432: Guatemala, 561; Honduras, 357; and 
Nicaragua, 341. 
It is also important to bear in mind that the persistence of high rates of 
illiteracy for adults and juveniles is a sign of sluggishness in incorporating 




Countries Year 15 years and over 15--24 years 
Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
El Salvador 1971 93.2 22.1 59.3 28.8 10.3 43.4 
Guatemala 1973 ' 53.9 28.2 68.6 45.4 20.5 60.4 
Honduras 1974 41.6 21.1 54.4 27.1 9.4 a/ n.a. 
Nicaragua 1971 42.4 19.3 65.3 35.1 11.5 58.9 
Source : ECLAC, on the basis'of official figures, 
a/ Capital city. 
The differences between the indicators of illiteracy for adults and for 
juveniles are small, and those of the latter continue to show high rates, which, 
when broken down by urban and rural areas, réflect a growing differentiation, with 
profound implications for the political processes and national integration. 
As is well known, the special conditions of the system of economic and social 
relations in these countries'causé the key problem to be the relation between the 
State and society, and this aspect has frequently been central to the interpretation 
of what happens there. 
Finally, in the Caribbean countries, it would be necessary to introduce 
various subtypologies, since: the'cultural differences (of which language is merely 
the most apparent), their different economic and social systems, the type of 
relationship they have, established with different centres, and many other elements 
contribute to the diversity prevailing there. There are obvious differences in 
their levels of development, one of which may be illustrated by their diverse 
degrees of urbanization. Similar variations in urbanization are to be found in the 
English-speaking Caribbean countries. 
PERCENTAGE OF URBANIZATION IN THREE CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES 
1950 1960 . 1980 . 2000 
Cuba 47.4 54.1 67.0 78.9 
Haiti 10.5 13.0 23.1 31.0 
Dominican Republic 21.6 29.0 46.8 62.0 
Source : ECLAC, on the basis of bfficial figures. 
Again, there are differences in their educational development. In 1980 the 
percentage of illiterates aged 15 and over was 3.9% in Cuba (there is no illiteracy 
among the under-24s), 26.4% in the Dominican Republic and 71.3% in Haiti. 
/The situation 
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The situation in the Caribbean is obviously of particular complexity for 
an aggregated analysis. In the subregion there are cultural and social models 
of English, Dutch, Spanish and French origins, the latter somewhat transformed in 
the long history of independent life of Haiti. In addition, the composition of 
their populations is subject to cultural patterns from African and Asian 
societies, which contribute specific features to the recent constitution of 
the nationalities of some of those countries. Finally, linguistic integration 
has not been achieved in some of them: the official language coexists with 
creole speech, or different types of !Ipatois" are spoken side by side with 
indigenous languages or English or Spanish. 
In this context, it is important to stress that in the English-speaking 
countries educational policies were aimed at a basic cultural homogenization 
which began with the improvement of the primary school, and later extended to 
high school, the criteria on higher education always consisted of limiting its 
quantitative expansion by applying selective academic standards. The foregoing 
distinguishes them from the historical evolution of the Latin American countries 
—except for those of the Southern Cone and Costa Rica-- which recorded in 
recent decades a simultaneous expansion in all educational levels and attained 
high rates of enrolment in. higher education without having attained the . 
universalizatiOn of primary education. ~ " 
2.,The status.of youth jn relation to their specific situations 10/ 
In the first type of countries referred to, the proportion of young people in 
the population is significant. In Brazil, 20.3% of the population consisted of 
young people.in 1970; in Colombia, 18.2% of the total were young,people in 1964, 
while by 1981,the proportion had increased to 22.5%.« The trend to an increase 
in the importance of the juvenile group might, however, be related to the fact 
that fertility rates have"dropped,and the decline in the number of people under 
14 years has had an .incidence in the value of the. recorded figures. 
Another.important feature is that of migrations, which largely explain the 
increment in urban population. In Mexico, the urban population increased from 
50.8% of the total in 1960 to 70% in 1985. In the case of Brazil, one-third 
of the population consisted of migrants and this share rose in 1980. The 
destination of migrants was the urban areas, although quite a few left for 
agricultural areas with developed capitalist characteristics or for new settlement 
zones, in which they became incorporated as labourers or squatters. 
In the migration processes young people usually represent a higher share 
than adult migrants. The migratory flow of youth goes preferentially to urban 
areas and, at least in the case of Brazil, the urban-urban flow is beginning 
to prevail, for example, from cities in the.North-East to those in the Centre/ 
South. The Colombian ease exhibits some peculiarities, with a relatively 
substantial rate of migration —an annual average of 3.2% between 1964 and 1973— 
dropping to 2.1% by 198.2, which perhaps was due to a decline in the industrializing 
model as well as to lower population growth. 
/ENGLISH-SPEAKING 
ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN: WORKING POPULATION 15 YEARS AND OVER BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION, 1970 
• 
Countries Working population 
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Jamaica . 487 269. . 12.9. 70.9 3.6 4.5 2.5 2.1 3.2 
Trinidad and : 
Tobago 227 409 11.7 57.9 9.6 • 7: 1 6.8 . 2.9 3.5 
Guyana 147 526 15.1 , 63.6 5.6 10.4 . ' 2 " 1.7 5.9 
Barbados ;• 83 502 ; 7.7 • .51.6 59.3 9.7 4.2 . 2.2 1.2 
Dominica 19 627 12.9 69.1 3.8 8.9 1.5 ' 1.9 1.5 
Grenada • " 25 589 ' 9.0 77.4 3.3 4.9 2;. 5 1.4 ' 1.2 
Monserrät 3 693 10.6 65.3 3.4 . 12.6 2.4 H • 4.. 1 1.1 
St. Kitts/Nevis , .12 197 6.3 71.0 3.6 10.1 . ' 2,3 '. : 2.. 6 • 3.9 ' 
St. Luc.ia . , 26 416 51.1 "•30.1 2.1 11.4' 1". 5 ... 1,7 1.9 
St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines. 20 713 14.1 70.3 3.5 7.2 •: 2.1 .'1-7 0.8 
Source: Lawrence D. Carrington,. Education and Development in the English--Speaking ^ Caribbean; UNESCO-ECLÄC-UNDP 
b/ 
Prciject. "Desarrollo y Educacion en America Latina y el Caribe", DEALC/16, Buenos Aires, October, 1978. 
An "0" level certificate, taken at about 15 years of age, indicates that the student has finished the basic 
cycle of secondary education. '•• 
An "A" level certificate, taken at about 18 years of age, indicates that the student has completed, the full 
secondary education cycle and has the necessary qualifications for. entering university. 
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It is worth stressing in these cases the special significance of the entry 
of youth into the world of work. In Colombia the share of youth in the 
economically active population was 28% in 1970, and from that date it grew 
steadily up to 1981, whereas the share of youth in the total rural economically 
active population increased only slightly; data for the age group 15 to 29 years 
of age —in the country's seven main cities— indicate an increase for men 
from 23.6% in 1971 to 44.1% in 1981 and for women from 37.6% to 56%, in relation 
to the total number of economically active women in the cities. 
Similar situations appear to have occurred in countries with high 
expansion in employment and urbanization before the present crisis. Thus, for 
instance, according to data from Brazilian censuses for the years 1970 and 1980, 
the employment rate of people under 15 years nearly doubled, and the rate of 
activity of people from 15 to 17 years of age living in urban zones rose 
considerably, especially among men (38.8% in 1970 and 50.4% in 1980). This is 
in contrast with a trend to a reduction in male economic activity with the 
extension of education. 
In Brazil a large proportion of young people entered the industrial sector, 
mostly as wage-earners, and it is interesting to note that the services sector 
has lost importance, even as regards female work. Other jobs such as domestic 
service —or at another level, teachings- were less important in terms of 
incorporation than commerce and industry. In Mexico it is seen that something 
similar seems to have happened, when the composition of the active population 
is considered. Thus, between 1950 and 1980 the economically active population 
in the secondary sector nearly doubled its share in the total, and rose from 
13.6% to 25.9%. 
The crisis which began to evidence itself around 1980 often resulted in 
falls in employment, and cases of disguised unemployment began to be frequent 
among young people, who were also affected by overt unemployment. Jobs obtained 
no longer corresponded to expectations. In the Colombian case the most outstanding 
phenomenon was a loss in the relation which existed between more schooling, better 
employment and higher wages. In 1964, during the development boom of the industrial 
urban model, the highest unemployment rate was for the illiterate population 
(23.7%), the population with secondary education recorded a rate of 13.5% and 
that with university education a rate of 10.8%. In contrast, between 1976 and 1978 
the highest unemployment indexes were for those who had finished high school 
(12.6%) or technical secondary education (21.0%). As in other cases, the 
underemployment of professionals was significant, and many of them moved to 
activities different from those of their professional training. 
As regards the linkages between education and the economic and social system, 
the case of Colombia is a good example. As education expanded it came to be 
considered as a channel for social mobility, which implied the secularization of 
knowledge and of the ideological basis of the organization of society, the 
dissemination of values and patterns of urban life, and expectations of modernization 
and development. However, the exclusion of certain groups aggravated the general 
situation and, due to the type of education given and to the differentiation of 
levels attained, new forms of stratification were introduced. 
/The case 
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The case of Brazil shows that economic growth is not always accompanied by 
homogenization of social development3 but often reflects the polarization lines 
due to disparities in regional development. For this reason, statistical r 
averages often conceal opposite situations such as urban versus rural illiteracy.• 
In the 1980 census it was seen that the schooling level of the Brazilian 
population remained low, the average years of study being 3.3 .for the population 
5 years of age and over. Although efforts were made to increase the duration of 
the schooling period to 8 years, the improvements recorded werë in retention in 
the final courses, not in enrolment in the first four school years. On the other 
hand.. some pupils attempt to improve their educational situation and 3 at least 
in the case of Sao Paulo, young workers often proceed with their studies at 
evening or night schools. 
The Mexican case, which presents more or less similar problems, may be 
mentioned as an example of an important effort, to change the situation. In'1970 
illiteracy in the population of over 15 years came to 25.8%, but by 1980 this 
figure declined to 17% for the population as a whole. In urban areas, between 
the same dates, the'"figure declined-from 16;7% to 5.9%, and in the rural areas, 
where the-problem is more serious, there was also à substantial improvement, 
from 39.7% to 18.9%,. 
In Brazil, with specific reference to young people (i.e., the age group 
from 15 to 24), illiteracy amounts to 14.5% among males and to 10.8% among females. 
It is interesting to note in this case, unlike in many others, that illiteracy 
is greater among men than among women. 
Also in this casé, despite deficiencies in basic education, a strong 
expansion in higher education was observed in thé past decade, and it may be 
that this feature characterizes the pattern of this style of development. In 
1960 there was 0.3 university students for each 100 students enrolled in the first 
year of first grade, but in 1980 the ratio was 3.4 university students for each 
100 students enrolled in the first year of first grade3 so that the relative share 
of higher •education had increased by a factor of 10. 
The second group of countries is also characterized by accelerated 
modernization processes in which the State has played an important role. This 
State role is clearly perceived in the impulse given to education. Thus, in 
the case of Panama 11/ a policy designed to increase the number of schools and 
teachers was implemented, with the result that the proportion of people without 
education dropped by approximately half between 1960 and 1980, both in rural 
and urban areas. The percentage of people without education in urban areas, 
which amounted to 7.6% in 1960, dropped by 1980 to 4.2%, while in rural areas 
it fell from 44.2% in 1960 to 23% in 1980. Of course there are still important 
differences between the two areas. It should also be noted that the population 
with high educational levels increased considerably: in 1960 the population in . 
urban areas with 10 or more years of education came to 18.7% of the total, 
whereas by 1980 the proportion amounted to 36.3%. 
/In Venezuela, 
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In Venezuela, the educational effort has also continued. For instance, 
whereas in 196.0,>.49% of young people between 12 and 17 years of age were 
incorporated into the educational system, in 1980 the figure was 60.9%. 
In Ecuador, the greater retention capacity attained by the school system, 
is also remarkable. In the rural environment in 1962, only one out of every 
17 young people between 15 and 19 years of age attended school, but by 1982 
the proportion had risen to 1 out of 2.5. In the urban environment in 1962 this 
figure was 1 for•• every., 2.7, but in 1982 1 for every 1.5. 
In terms of total schooling, the typical educational level of a young 
urban Ecuadorian on reaching adulthood also evolved favorably. In 1062 it 
was 5.5 years of schooling, in 1974 5.8, and in 1982 11.1, that is, approximately 
a complete secondary education. The figures show how fast and recent this 
process has been. 
Undoubtedly, the changes in education have had an influence on the type 
of occupations which young people perform. In Panama, there is an interesting 
change in the participation of young people in different occupational strata 
between 1960 and 1980. 
PANAMA: CHANGE IN THE OCCUPATIONAL PARTICIPATION OF 
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Source : ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
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In. 1980, the, percentage of'youth, in the non-manual strata.rose, while the per-
centage in the lower strata;.; engaged in, primary activities, fell. It is interesting 
to note that the perceatage-in jrtanual labour and,personal services.'.rose, considerably 
in 1970 and.fell in?;lSt8©. . iHhis change:.was caused by the sharp growth of the modern 
services sector which employs a large number of young people,. ,,,. 
In general, where modernization and industrialization have occurred fairly 
recently, as in this type of countries, -the school system has become main mech-
anism of social mobility. ., Some problem^ are already.heginnirig.^ to r^ise^^oweyert fo> 
example j there is a growing pressure on jobs requiring higher...skirts and, poten-
tially, there is pressure to enter the middle and higher strata of,,-lsociety. 
In countries of the third-type* e.,g-.* Peru and Bolivia,...modernization has gone 
hand-rin-hand with urbanization. In Bolivia, urbanization is closely associated with 
youth; according to the.1976 census, somewhat over.half the young people of Bolivia 
(51%) live .in urban areas. This has.also occurred, to a significant, extent in Peru. 
During the interval between the 19.61 and.1981 .censuses, the urban populationvof the 
country rose from 47% to 65%;of.the total.population and the percentage .of. youth 
in urban areas rose from : 51%. to 70%. •/;.... n. 
In this/iregaMV..'it.¡is: important tq-snote the effect of metropolitanization. In 
1961, 22% of all youBg-people".in1 Peru lived in the capital city, Lima, .apcj in 1981, 
the percentage had::risen-;to .31%. - The phenomenon of-. migration, .occurred, precisely 
at the beginning of this period: in 1961, the great majority of urban youth were 
from a rural provincial background. ;In. 1081,,on the, other,.hand, most;young people 
were natives of the cities-and, thus:made. up the first urban generation., Th,ese young 
people, who are now part of the urban population, have developed patterns.of 
• behaviour which involve breaking with the traditional, order. 
In the case, of Bolivia, socio-spatial mobility is extremely significant not only 
as regards-internal'migration but-also as regards outward migration. The phenomenon 
has mobilized youth, since the. largest percentage of emigrants are young people. 
Beginning in 1952Bolivia underwent significant political, social,, cultural 
and economic transformations. As regards the economic structure.,.in many cases ther. 
was a breakdown of,the family economic unit and many family, members, especially 
young people, entered-the job market. , 
The housing survey, of 1976 shows that the economically active population under 
age 24 amounted to: 31.8% of the total population. Half the youth in rural areas 
worked, as did 40% of the,youth in urban areas.: Migration —which, as mentioned 
before, involved a high percentage of youth-- was clearly motivated by the search foj 
jobs;'in fact, the job-market is being shaped by the supply of .young workers. It 
should be noted that unemployment is low among young.people.; .unemployed young people 
--as well as persons seeking work for the.first-timer-...only; amounted to 5.7% of the 
economically, active .population between the ages-of; 15.,and...24.-.. 
Contrary to the case in other situations, the educational levels of young work 
ers are relatively low, although one must of course bear in mind the educational 
level of the overall population. 
Among the young economically active population, 14.7% have no education, 43.9% 
have finished some years of elementary education, 20.1% have completed some years 
of intermediate education and 14.2% have completed some years of secondary education 
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The phenomena of internal migration and entry into the job market are also 
significant. Many young people emigrate, to Santa Cruz to work and a large number 
of temporary workers are young people.- It should also be noted that 73% of 
migrants to Santa Cruz come from an urban background, while most, migrants to La 
Paz come from the country. 
Peru has a high percentage of overall unemployment and underemployment in 
the economically active population as a whole. According to studies by the 
Regional Employment Programme for Latin America (PREALC), the figures for 
so-called "informal occupations" were alarmingly high. Despite this situation, 
a large number of young people entered wage-earning occupations. According to 
figures available in 1972, 50.7% of young workers belonged to the category of 
manual workers or employees; this share was higher than that of the total 
economically active population, which was only 44.4%. Although these percentages 
dropped in 1981, the proportion of wage-earners among young people (47.4%) was 
still larger than that of the economically active population (43.1%). The number 
of independent workers, a category which often conceals underemployment, was high 
among youth. In 1981, 32.2% of all young people fell into this category, but the 
percentage among the total economically active population was 41.9%. 
It is worth noting thè importance of young labour within the family, 
especially in the rural areas. In 1981, 21.7% of the young economically active 
population in rural areas was made up of unpaid family workers. 
As the educational system expanded, especially during the 1970s, fewer 
young people joined the economically active population; however., many relatively 
well-educated young people still have low incomes. This increases tension and 
can lead to a deterioration of the value which young people attach to education. 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay are considered as a fourth type of countries. 
In them, modernization occurred somewhat earlier than in the rest of the region. 
In Argentina and Uruguay, there is a strong trend towards crystallization; there 
is less mobility, both generational and intra-generational, than in other 
countries. A salient feature of Argentine society is the reproduction in the 
younger generation of the trends and differences already existing in the 
intermediate generation —ages 25 to 35— and even in the parents' generation, 
i.e., the age group between 45 and 55. Young people are therefore quite similar 
to their parents and this would-seem to confirm our previous observation that the 
society is becoming crystallized. With regard to Uruguay, it has often been 
noted that the society is not very open to expansion, and young people are often 
faced with narrow and rigid limits, to which is added a certain rigidity in 
social stratification. It has, of course, been argued that a "middle-class 
style" is a feature which has permeated Uruguayan society as a whole. This may 
have to do with the visibility of the actions of middle-class students, although 
there are still differences with respect to upper-class youth, young workers or 
rural middle-class youth, the latter being fairly small in number. 
/In both 
- 37 -
In both cases, the proportion of young people in the population rose more 
slowly than in other countries of the region. Uruguay has often been mentioned 
as a country where demôgraphic transition occurred .at an early stage so" that the 
population now appears to.be an "aged population". It has also been suggestéd 
that the main feature of the country is the tendency of most demographic 
indicators to remain static. '. .j, . •  ^ ' 1. 
Despite this, one important event did-roccur- after 1970.: ffy^ à ..reaUl't of the 
economic stagnation and of the aggravation 6f internal- politic^ l.Iapd s.pçial ; 
conflicts, a heavy Outward migration began. •-.- . ,1".' ... 
The magn it tide of the phenomenon is attested, to- by. the.; fpljlpwing figures: in 
1968, negative migration absorbed approximately 20%.of ?the vegetative growth; in 
1972, around 60%; in 1973; almost 100% and in 1974, the figurer amounted to twice • 
the vegetative growth, • ' 
Migration between 1963 and 1975 was predominantly,masculine, with 31% being • 
represented by young people. The largest age group consisted of persons between 
the ages of 20 and 24; this group accomted for 21% .of all migrants. 
Uruguay is known for having a high degree of urbanization. In 1963, rural 
youth represented 20.7% of the total young population and this figure dropped'to 
18% in 1975." Rural-urban migration was not, however,: very significant in numerical 
terms, given the low population living in rural areas. .The effect of rural 
migration may have been more to depopulate the . rural areas than to change the 
character of the urban areas. 
In Argentina, the young rural population in small and, what is more' 
significant, is shrinking. In 1960, three out of every ten young people lived in 
rural areas, vMle in 1984 fewer than twoout of -every ten young, people lived in 
rural areas.. Nonetheless, there are interesting differences within the country. 
Thus, for example, in the so-càlled coastal-provinces --except for Santa Fè--
and. in the northeast, more than one-third of all young people are still living -
in rural areas. ' " 
There is a considerable amount of internal migrations and young people seem 
to move to provinces where modernization has been fairly recent, such as Santa Fe, 
Côrdoba and the provinces of the 'Patagonia. The areas in which modernization 
took place at an early stage —Buenos Aires, for example—. tend to have an older 
population. This is also true of'-the areas which are noted for their backwardness. 
The more recently modernized provinces, on the other hand,- are being rejuvenated. 
Young people play ah important role in migratory , processes. . During the 
period. 1975-1980, young people represented 26.8% of total migrants in the country, 
this being defined in terms of inter¿provincial, migration. During that period, 
almost half a million young people were migrants.r . 
Despite the fact that the provinces with a more dynamic economy have, as 
mentioned above, attracted a large number of migrants, it should be noted that 
there are still no clear-cut poles of stabilization. 
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Both Uruguay and Argentina have traditionally had high levels of education. 
In 1950, Uruguay was ranked first in Latin America as regards schooling provided 
at all levels of education. In 1980, it had lost this ranking. • 
This is not the only important development, however; inequality measured in 
terms of social stratification has increased. Around 1960 j 32% of all students 
enrolled in universities belonged to the higher income sectors, while in 1968, 
the share of these sectors was 27% (compared with the previous percentage); in 
1960, the middle sectors- accounted for 43% and in 1968, their share had increased 
by 32%. Thè popular.strata accounted for 12% in 1960 and fell to 10% in 1963. 
The case of Chile is important because of the policies that have affected the 
educational system itself. Between the 1960s and the early 1970s, the educational 
system was expanded; during the period 1965-1973, this mostly benefited the middle 
and upper sectors, since the higher growth rates took place; at those educational 
levels. Opportunities for social mobility for the new generations of the middle 
sectors increased. The contraction which took place after that affected the 
modalities of higher and elementary education.. In the case of higher education, 
alternatives such as thé so-called professional institutes were created, and in 
the case of elementary education, there was a process of decentralization and 
adjustment to specific local conditions. 
In addition to the policies which had this effect, in 1975, a very abrupt 
economic adjustment took place which led to a reduction in levels of income. The 
reaction of some sectors of society to those circumstances led to a drop in the 
rate of schooling of young people and an increase in their participation in the 
job market. In those cases, the need to get a job led to a decline in the demand . 
for education. 
Another important event was the increase in the differential profitability 
of education which occurred in recent years. In 1976, young people with a complete 
university education earned on average a salary 5.5 times greater than those with, 
a complete elementary education (8 years) and 1.9 times greater than those with 
a complete secondary education. In 1980, young people with a university education 
received a salary 6.4 times greater than those with a primary education and 2.4 
times greater than those with a secondary education. 
With respect to the relationship of youth with work, the employment crisis 
has a long history in the case of Chile. It has. a different impact on different 
social strata and elicits different responses according to the different overall 
strategies adopted by families. In the lower strata, in times of crisis, young 
people and women tend to seek jobs as a way of helping to solve the problem of 
low family income. In the upper strata, on the other hand, in times of crisis the 
trend is to withdraw from the job market, either because the jots available do 
not meet expectat ion s and these people can afford to refrain from working or 
because they are able to continue as students without the family's income being 
too seriously affected. 
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In the casé of Chile, there has been a sharp employment crisis in industry . 
aiid a drop in public employment as well; this has seriously. affected the popular ,.,,, 
and middle' sectors. By comparison, with thé reduction of labour employed in the 
manufacturing industry, there has been an increase in labour employed in other 
sectors, although this has not compensated, for the drop.in manufacturing jobs. 
A comparison between..' 1971 'ahd 1980. |will show. ..th^ t, the .percentage of young people ., 
viio are unemplqyi&d or engaged.'in; niii\i.m\wi-wag$ activities,, in domes tig/service, in 
own-accotnt work and in' commerce and marginal services has doubled among the young 
non-agricultural economically active population. These young people are naturally 
excluded .from what may be .«tefined, as. a positive, ijvs^ rtian in ¿.the , job.vpia^ ket. Those 
who are excluded are .ei^ein'engaged in marginal, -jobs .(46or.-.unemployed,.(53.4%); 
the latter percentage is indicative of the predominance ;of.p^n\unemployment in 
the economy. In "addition, even, .among those, who are employed,, there r.i s a high... 
level of job instability. . ; . 
In Argentina, unemployment is lower than in Chile, and Uruguay is in an 
intermediate position between the two countries, with high unemployment rates 
from 1982 onwards and half of the open unenployment being accounted for by young 
people under age 25. 
It is interesting to note that," particularly in societies such as that of 
Argentina, the unemployed or those who have .difficulty finding jobs, but have a 
high level of education, channel their demands towards entry into the university. 
Nonetheless, as in Uruguay, many people combine jobs and studies. In 1980, 
two thirds of the student population of the Uhiversity..of Buenos Aires were working 
and studying at the same time and 60% held full-time jobs. 
In Argentina,^ the types of jobs held by young'people are more or less 
similar tç those held by the economically active population as a whole. Most 
employed persons work in the tertiary sector, understood in the broad sense as 
including commerce, : services, „finance and others. Individually, however, the 
most importât group is .still, th.at of skilled industrial workers, and. this, is 
also tliè càse with résppct to youth. There are, however, some interesting .. 
differences.' Young peoi>ie, do not, as one might expect, prefer work in modern 
industry oyer, traditional jobs,; yhat counts, apparently,...i.s,.the g^ree,-of,..sk.il 1 
required in either type of.: j*6b.. Thus, young'pëople ,are..under-represen.tedt.inn 
constructiœ, but over-represented in industries such as clothing and shoemaking, 
which despite being.VtraHitional" occupations, require-,certain . degrees, of skill 
and qualification«.; . . . ,.< •-
In a more crystallized society such as Argentina, the family plays a role 
in the labour market. „In industry, for. example, it is the parents who introduce 
their children to'theiroccupation, providing them information on .the operation 
of the markét and' teaching them skills. Crystallization produces problems, 
however, since;' even though young people often find, jobs .similar-to those of their 
parents, their educational level is considerably higher. 
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Despite the aforementioned similarities with respect to insertion in the 
labour market, young people appear to be over-represented in less desirable 
activities, as is the case with family workers not .receiving a fixed wage, domesti 
work, own-account work, etc. This is particularly true in the poor provinces. 
In Uruguay there is a long-standing practice of combining jobs and higher: 
studies; in 1960, 45.2% of university students Were working regularly. Along 
with this j however, it should be borne in' mind that a high percentage of 
university graduates end up working in jobs which are not related 'to their', chosen 
profession. • " r ' "'•"; "'; - ':"' 
i • ' The decline in the growth rate of the Uruguayan economy, which began in the 
1960s, had a sharp impact on youth: by 1968, half of all unemployed persons were 
young people and this situation still obtains in 1984, with the added problem 
that overall unemployment is higher. Obviously, youth who did have jobs usually 
received lower-than-average wages. 
The Central American countries, which make up the fifth type, have experience 
serious political and social problems; paradoxically, these problems are related 
to the growth of the 1960s and 1970s. The prospects opened up by the. establishment 
of the Ceritral American Common Market generated a certain amount of industrial 
growth and agricultural diversification, although the two phenomena were not 
closely interrelated. The Central American countries are still agrarian 
societies, although they have diversified with new products such as cotton, meat 
and sugar. Growth has brought with it increased social polarization, inasmuch as 
it can be said that around 40% of the population live in abject poverty. 
Despite the fact that the population is predominantly rural, there is 
migration to the cities, although the trend is towards concentration in a rsingle 
city. It should be noted that the development of agrarian economies of a more 
capitalistic type has led to certain destruction of the peasant economies. 
Agricultural workers, who can be mobilized for the harvest, have tended to "take 
refuge" irt the cities, where they can do work which enables .them to supplement . 
their seasonal agricultural wages. Paradoxically, , the cities Have, tecome places 
where agricultural labour is reproduced. It should also be noted1that migrants 
are predominantly' aimong young people> especially illiterate young people. 
Another salient feature of the Central American com tries is the density of 
their populations. In El Salvador, population density is two or more times 
higher than in Europe. Guatemala, Costa Rica and Honduras have a density two or 
more times greater than that of the United States. In 1983, El Salvador had 
260 inhabitants per square kilometre, Guatemala had 77 per square kilometre, and 
Costa Rica had 49 per square kilometre. " 
The problems of the young population become very clear when one considers 
the projections of the labour force, the growth of which is mainly accounted for 
by youth. The following table is particularly revealing in this regard: 
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PROJECTED SIZE OF THE LABOUR FORCE 1980-2000 
Country , . Year Percentage of change 1980 1985' 1990 2000 1980-2000 
Costa Rica 775 921 1 065 1 319 70.2 
El Salvador ; 1 524-. 1 845 2 191. .. 2 962 94.4 
Guatemala 2 288 2 681 • 3 096 4 063 77.6 
Honduras 1 041 1 255 1 502 2 089 100.7 : • 
Nicaragua 834 1 028 1 250 1 737 108,. 3 
Source: Tsui Amy Ong, Illustrative Functional Projections 1975-2000, Chicago^ 
Community and Family-Study Centre, 1979. 
Finally, reference has been made to the diversity of circumstances to be 
found in the Caribbean region. In a study of the situation of youth in 17 
English-speaking Caribbean countries, it is pointed out. that in none of those ' 
countries did the younger generation represent less than 16% of the population 
in 1970 or 1980. Although population growth rates are not very high (1.53% in 
the 1970s), migratory flows are of undoubted importance, and young people are 
particularly significant in this respect. In Jamaica, for example, the population 
between 15 and 24 years of age (94 183 persons), accounted for 32% of the 
migratory flow in the 1960s. Equivalent figures were 22.3% in the case of 
Trinidad and Tobago, 46% in Guyana and 27% in Barbados. 
The relation of young people with the world of work is also of interest, 
juvenile unemployment being extremely high in some instances. The above-mentioned 
study pointed out that it amounted to as much as 88.5% in Haiti and 75.9% in 
Trinidad'and Tobago. In most cases young people represent, an important proportion 
of the working force. An illustrative figure quoted in this respect is that of 
Saint Christopher and Nevis, where they represent 29.6% of the total working 
population. 
It is nevertheless necessary to bear in mind that generalization is hot 
possible in the case of the Caribbean area owing not only to appreciable differences 
between the component countries, but also to considerable contrasts in the 
situation of1 young people. It is sufficient to mention as an .example in this 
context the differences in the number of students, entering secondary education, 
expressed as a percentage of the .12 to 17 age group; in 1980, this proportion, 
amounted in Cuba to 70%, in the Dominican Republic to 32% and in Haiti to 12%. 
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IV. PROSPECTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The above-mentioned particulars, the detail and extent of which may be referred 
to in the relevant documentation,12/ illustrate some of the particular circumstance; 
of youth in the region. 
It is often presumed that the young oortend the future of a country and 
endeavours are made to see in them signs of possible future changes in national 
society. It is perhaps truer to say that in the: Caribbean countries the young 
express more visibly the acute problems of the present and many of the uncertainties 
of the future. In practice, the situation of the younger generation is as that 
of-society-as-a whole. • The structural changes that have undoubtedly taken place 
in the region :;have resulted in the young benefitting from the positive features 
which these changes unquestionaly entail, but they aré at the same time affected 
by certain traumatic experiences that have also arisen. One of these refers to 
the social expectations that accumulate during the process of change. For some 
time endeavours have been made to characterize the region by pointing out that a 
veritable "revolution of expectations" has been.taking place. Although it is true 
to say.that possible dangers have been discerned in the lack of correspondence 
between those expectations and the conditions that might effectively come about, 
it is no less true that they have acted as a stimulant in the attainment of new 
goals and options. 
.The difficulties always present in the reality of circumstances --which have 
undoubtedly been aggravated by the current crisis— may perhaps account for the 
phenomenon that in other European contexts has been termed "sceptical youth". 
This scepticism has not been due to frustration over the levels of development 
attained but may rather be ascribed to a static form of society where "the mixture 
as before" is to be expected but cultural changes are improbable. 
To judge from the rélevant indicators, it would seem that the situation of 
the region has other features. Urbanization has attained surprising magnitude in 
many countries, with almost two-thirds of the population now living in urban areas 
in the region as a whole. Urban growth has not been accompanied, however, by the 
necessary expansion of basic social services. The experience:of urban life may thus 
be in conflict with the expectations entertained by the young and may have given 
rise to a certain amount of scepticism. 
To this should be added the fact that the limited social services in rural 
areas tend to create an impression of exclusion among the younger population, 
further stimulating their inclination to migrate to the cities. . 
The first generations undergoing structural change and urbanization 
experienced a sense of achievement —not so much in terms of earnings as in 
participation in social services for their children and in political terms. For 
subsequent generations educational expansion and the development of a non-manual 
and industrial labour market have provided a degree of satisfaction of initial 
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expectations which in some countries soon become transformed into a barrier to 
social nobility and in others have become converted by the current crisis into a • ; 
situation of growing unemployment and of inconsistency between educational 
preparation and available employment opportunities. • 
Changes in the structure of employment and in the qualifications needed to 
obtain jobs have been accompanied by the generalization of wage relationships, 
though in some countries the decline in the number of the self-employed, i.e., 
those in informal occupations, has been less than expected, while in others, the 
impact of the crisis and of the policies applied have reversed the wage.-earning 
trend. 
Young people currently face a saturated labour market in which high educationa 
levels do not ensure employment or only open the way to jobs in precarious and 
poorly paid occupations or in others which are of a similar level to those obtained 
by the preceding, less educationally qualified, generation but now enjoy less 
prestige. Finally, young people inay suffer prolonged unemployment, increasingly 
identified with social exclusion. 
Improvement in educational levels is one of the most positive developments in 
recent times but it has nevertheless been observed in some cases that educational 
qualifications are no longer rewarded by more responsible or better paid employment 
— a circumstance that gives rise to frustrations with regard to expectations of 
the social mobility that was formerly associated with education. 
' Improvement in the educational profile of young people represents one of the 
region's most significant types of potential. Although under conditions of economic 
restriction and low individual earnings the individual pay-off of educational 
investment may have deteriorated, it is important, from a social standpoint, that 
qualified human resources should find employment that allows them to develop their 
capabilities and affords them the opportunity to participate in collective 
decisions. 
It is consequently important that changes should be promoted in economic and 
social organization to make possible the application of more productive and 
innovative capabilities thanks to the educational levels of the young. More 
advanced cultural preparation may thus be translated into more rational social 
conditions, greater efficiency in all the activities carried out in social life, 
and better chances for the young to intervene in the definition of national 
development styles and in the organization and management of the units where they 
work. But it may also be translated into providing better opportunities for young 
people who are compelled by the crisis to delay their insertion in productive 
economic life, through the development of dynamic training policies —especially 
in scientific and technical areas— designed to help the young to face the new 
situations deriving from economic and social progress, and which are maturing in 
the form of a scientific and social revolution despite cyclical periods of crisis. 
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As pointed out in the initial pages of the present document this scepticism, 
which may derive from difficulties of incorporation in basic social institutions, 
may spread to other, dimensions of social life, especially with regard to Social 
and political institutions that ensure democratic stability and make possible 
appropriate changes. 
Giving warning of these dangers certainly does not imply disregard of the 
positive aspécts (which are many), however. Consequently, although in ordér to 
move towards the solution of the problems of the young it is necessary to' solve the 
problems of' society as* a whole, it is no less true that the young themselves may 
represent-—and not; only in- a potential sense— an effective instrument to this end. 
The current crisis may thus be faced in a manner which does not limit the 
efforts to the recovery of former levels, but is also viewed as an .opportunity to 
correct and submit to discussion the preceding.style of development,.since its 
features contain -several endogenous elements that particularize and impart gravity 
to the crisis. 
A trend that merely emphasizes the idea of recovery may mean that the only 
message transmitted to the young is that they should curb their impatience. 
Moreover, due to.the effect of the situations of urgency created by the crisis, 
the necessary átructural reforms must often be deferred, freqüently concentrating 
instead on the adoption of decisions which result. (although hot intentionally) 
in the possibilities of participation being, restricted. Policies that stress the 
attitude of "submissive expectancy" without promoting basic changes or encouraging 
participation are incompatible with the democratic impulses prevailing in the 
region, and democracy itself may be perceived as a formalism that merely encourages 
passive adherence. 
Policies —not only for the young but also for the participation' of those 
assisting their active participation in the resolution of the crisis and the setting 
in motion of activities of social interest— should consequently be drawn up without 
delay so that by co-operating in the necessary transformation of society they may 
at the same time transform themselves. 
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" ' SUMMARY OF THE DOCUMENT SITUATION AND PROSPECTS ' 
- ' ' • ' OF YOUTH IN LATIN AMERICA a/ -
The sttidy summarized in this annex was prepared for .the first Latin American 
Regional -Preparatory Meeting on Youth, the aims of which wej>e. to;: analyse the 
présent situation and future prospects of. young people in:, Latin America and the 
Caribbean-, with emphasis oh the subjects of youth and.-development, social movements, 
and programmes and policies' for this.,sector, and to work out a regional plan of 
attt-ion to promote'the objectives of the international Youth Year: Participation, 
Development ctnd' Peace. . 
At the aforesaid meeting the problems of youth were considered on three 
levels: a) the actual situation of the group, aged between .15 and. 24 years., b) its 
relation with society, its changes and its linkage with integral development, arid 
c) the study in greater depth of cèrtain essential topics and advancement in the 
theoretical and conceptual knowledge of the significance of the condition of youth 
in Latin America and the'Caribbean. 
The main aspects considered, were concerned with the. conceptual difficulties 
in defining the juvenile group, with the role of .youth in relation to the future, 
and with the responses that society should make to its new members —all of this 
in the context of the renewed quest for new concepts of development needed for» the 
restructuring of the region. The analysis revealed that the problems of the young 
reflect the problems of the societies in which they.are inserted and that therefore 
they should be studied within the framework of global economic development and of 
social and political changes in the region, with special attention to the social, 
economic and cultural' features which, taken together, enable specific groups to be 
identified. . '""""'.'". ' ; 
Consequently, the basic variables of the social transformation of: the region 
were noted, among them the growth of the population, the development possibilities 
of the economic system, and the increasing differentiation of social activities. 
Emphasis was laid on tbe demographic significance of youths the process of 
urbanization, the development of industrialization and its effects on the formation 
of societies with qualitative.differences. A review was made of the transformations 
in agriculture and in'educational conditions, and of their repercussions on social 
stratification. Some concrete aspects whose essential importance was noted at 
that first exercise in reflection and systématisation of knowledge on the condition 
of youth in the region are: the impact of the speed at which the changes occurred 
in the region; the difference in tempo and depth evinced by the transformations 
in the different countries; the sensation of uncertainty about the future : 
development of the region and its influence on the socialization of the young; 
the increasing gaps between the generations and between the young of different 
strata. 
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The main problem is that of the participation of the young, which indeed 
constitutes a key factor in the orientation of social change and in the creation 
of the social bases needed for the democratic forms that will enable different 
styles of development to be applied. 
The study examined a number of specific items in greater depth. Thus, in 
the analysis of the demographic structure, it was shown that the numerical weight 
of Latin. American youth amounted to 20.2% :of the population of the region. The 
growth of the population has been a phenomenon that has coincided with high rates 
of urbanization (whose tempo has increased considerably in recent decades), and 
is manifest in the fact that the juvenile group represents a proportion of 65.2% 
of the urban population. The agricultural population has suffered an aging process 
which has helped to increase the rural exodus, largely owing to .inefficient use 
of the agricultural population. The demographic trend has varied greatly from 
country to country, three main groups of countries being distinguished: the first, 
with 14.8% of the region's population, has low demographic trends and a better 
relative level of social development, and its population will have a lower relative 
weight by the year 2000; the second group has maintained high levels of fertility 
and was slow to urbanize; and there is a third and intermediate group with diverse 
and polarized trends. 
As regards the insertion of young people into the world of work, important 
changes were noted in the structure of production and stress was laid on the 
diversity of national situations ana trends, including the forms assumed by the 
industrialization process,.the growth of manufacturing industry, the dynamism of 
the modern tertiary sector and, in contrast, the maintenance of 36%.of the 
economically active population in agriculture. The proportion of young people in 
the economically active population has been high; it has had important effects on 
the displacement of adult employment and in other cases has resulted in'high rates 
of juvenile -unemployment. Although this has been showing.signs of a decline, 
especially in the youngest group, it is still very impressive in absolute terms and 
there has been an intensification of its urban character and a growing proportion 
of young women. 
The insertion of young people in the different economic sectors has had . 
differing characteristics. Owing to.migration their share in. agricultural'activity 
has tended to diminish and urban activity has become markedly segmented, with • 
polarization among the different social strata. If the countries aré grouped in' 
accordance with their type of development and-its influence on the occupational 
insertion of the young, it is observed that in the first group participation 
fluctuates between 24% and 26%, and 80% of the supply is produced in the urban ; 
areas, with low rates of growth of the economically active population; in the 
second group of countries, rural activity is predominant and, in urban activity, 
the informal sector and domestic service, with high rates of growth expected in 
the juvenile economically active population. In the third group¿ the importance 
of the rural sector is maintained, but it coexists with a large proportion of 
industries and services of modern type. Apparently the future rate of growth of the 
juvenile labour force in this group of countries will be lower than in the 
/preceding group. 
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preceding group. In this respect, juvenile female labour has acquired groxving 
importance and, although it continues to be incompletely recorded, especially in 
the case of agricultural activities, it has registered notable growth. The 
greatest increase in the participation rates corresponds to young women and in 
general it is necessary to distinguish the forms of occupational insertion-of 
women in accordance with the different social strata. Noteworthy here is the 
polarization in the work of women, a phenomenon which has tended to persist. . 
Moreover, the type of development has had an effect on juvenile female labour, 
which is higher ia countries that urbanised earlier, although it has also 
increased in predominantly agricultural countries. 
Unemployment and underemployment are undoubtedly one of the major problems 
facing young people of both sexes in the region. The lack of employment 
opportunities has resulted in acute open unemployment and high rates of under-
employment, especially in the urban areas. Underemployment is generally reflected 
in jobs without a future, especially for juveniles in the marginal or low-income 
strata. The irregular work of young people in Latin America is not complementary 
to other educational activities, but represents the lack of job opportunities. 
In the less developed countries unemployment is greater, especially among the 
less educated, and at the same time it has a general distorting effect, since 
higher educational levels have begun to be demanded for jobs which do not 
necessarily require them. 
An analysis was likewise made in the document of the educational 
transformation and its impact on the new générations. It stressed in the first 
place the great changes that have taken place in the education of Latin American 
youth in the last three decades, especially the fall in illiteracy, but at the same 
time the greater discrimination now suffered on account of this, the growth in 
primary education and the problems encountered by some sectors in completing it, 
the rise in secondary education and its gradual integration around general cultural 
training, and the rapid transformation of higher education. The particular 
features of the educational changes in the different countries of the region were 
analysed, and it was noted that those which had modernized early had achieved 
practically total primary schooling and like development at the intermediate and 
higher levels; a second group of countries had continued to marginate numerous 
social groups from full primary education but by expanding the higher levels had 
attained the greatest university coverage; a third group was characterized by 
differences and inequality between the urban and the rural population and uneven 
standards among the regions; and a fourth group had adopted integral planning of 
the educational process. Attention was drawn to the main conflicts and 
contradictions which have arisen from the transformation of. education in these 
different situations and which have weakened the democratic effect of its expansion. 
In view of their importance in terms of numbers and the vulnerability of 
their condition, the study gave priority to young people in marginal situations. 
After giving a brief summary of marginality in the region, the forra in which 
is produced was reviewed. The persistence of marginality in Latin America seems 
closely related to the styles of economic development in the region and linked 
with the phenomena of concentration. The marginal young have been characterized 
/by their 
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by their insertion at an early age into occupations of a very low level; thèy have 
generally not been able to complete their primary education; they have not had 
access to technical education or to any type of training, and in fact they have not 
even been able to derive real benefit from the basic education received. Two 
subjects were mentioned as highly relevant to their situation: their negative 
socialization and anomic conduct, and their political exclusion. Another type of 
mai'gination was suffered by rural youth, which has remained outside the processes 
of modernization and. development and has generally constituted persistent nuclei 
of poverty and deficient social integration. In relation to this group, an analysis 
was made of the transformations taking place in the rural sector and the particular 
situation of; indigenous youth. -
The complexity of the current situation and the future outlook were then 
disóussed. It was pointed out that the economic transformation had been unequal 
and that'the benefits were usually distributed inequitably. The changes affected 
••the...different social groups internally and were reflected in processes of different 
social mobility, in place of global systems of power linked with more or less 
favourable economic processes. : 
Iri this context the crisis was seen as a basic factor and it Was noted that 
the young would be the most affected by it. Among other topics of interest two 
were discussed: the capacity of the young to pressure for an alternative development 
style which Would be directed to the satisfaction of basic needs, and, secondly, 
the change that might be brought about by youth iri the definition of values that are 
expressed as social needs. 
The uncertainty about the' future was seen to be linked in this context With 
concern over the lack of a precise view on the direction of change arid over the 
state of youth as a reflection of this' uncertainty. It seemed clear that the 
society of the future would be different from that of the present, but this seemed 
more attributable to discontent with the present rather than to the attraction of 
the future. 
In addition to the changes already outlined,: the general anxiety was also 
influenced by cultural factors. The'debate dwelt on certain topics connected with 
the superposition of cultures, heterogeneity, and essential notions of cultural, 
identity, postulating the cultural challenge of a model for the future arid the' 
role of youth. • 
Another subject discussed was the importance of the relations between 
generations in a changing society. Although rebelliousness tends to be considered 
natural at a certain stage of life it has acquired a particular slant in the region 
owing to the educational gap and the change' .in occupations which alienates the 
generations one from another*- The options in development styles Were reviewed 




Another important item discussed in the study was that of youth and its role 
in the processes of change. The debate centred on the possibility of considering 
youth in Latin America as a social movement, given its heterogeneity, and of 
regarding it as a social actor. The social youth movement in Latin American history 
was analysed, with emphasis on such aspects as the youth of the 1920s (its demands 
for democracy and its role in the emergence of a Latin American consciousness), the 
problem of political options, as a characteristic of the youth movement between 
the crisis years and the Second World War, and a third period, occurring during 
the war and in the postwar years, in which there emerged, among other elements, 
the ideology of modernization. 
Some possible aspects of the present youth movement were put forward and, 
although it was recognized that there was increasing diversity among the topics 
that interest the young, it was suggested that there were some of a more general 
type such as the democratic commitment and the role of youth in relation to the 
subject of integration and the Nation-State. 
The last item dealt with concerned the links between society and youth. Two 
instances were discussed: socialization and social policy. The first instance 
covered two main socializing agents in the region: the family and education. In 
the case of the family the various situations were reviewed, including the • 
difficulties that the family faced in its socializing role and its decline as a 
decisive factor owing to the profound regional changes. Emphasis was placed on 
the cultural changes, the conflicts of low-income sectors and the complexity of 
their problems. Over and above the consideration of education as an element for 
the transmission of skills and knowledge, and recognizing its expansion as the 
result of social pressure, another three factors were considered as essential in the 
structuring of an alternative development style in the region: aspiration towards 
social mobility, the importance given to the cultural dimension, and the desire 
for national integration. In connection with social policy for youth the . 
difficulties of planning processes and their advances were reviewed, together with 
the problem of the sectoralization of themes and the difficulty in conceiving 
policies aimed at social groups involved in the dynamics of development and the 
emphasis on persons as a goal for society and as active participants in it. Finally, 
the study raised the question of the urgent need to mobilize and integrate the 
social forces in order to grapple with the problems of youth in the region. The 
goals proposed are not to be regarded as mechanisms for integrating youth into the 
current model of development, since the conditions in force would not permit it; 
they are rather a form of definition of new development options in relation to 
youth. 
The study presented reaffirms the concepts of the previous diagnosis approved 
in 1983, and on the basis of new knowledge acquired it explores more deeply the 
national situations and their diversity. It offers new conceptual and theoretical 
contributions on the condition of youth in Latin America and its significance and 
analyses a number of new topics relating to the situation of youth in the region: 
the changes in the socioeconomic structure, social institutions as a possible 
channel of insertion for youth, consumerism in Latin America and its impact on young 
people, the implications of the world of work, the importance of symbolic dimensions 
in the condition of youth, and the identity of youth vis-à-vis social stratification 
in the region. 

